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THE  MEXICAN  PESO crisis  of December  1994,  and its reverberations in 
the  financial  markets of  developing  countries  around the  world,  has 
intensified the debate over the nature of balance of payments crises  in 
developing  countries.  Many simple  explanations  have been given  for 
the crisis and its aftermath, but none of them does very well at account- 
ing for the main patterns of behavior in emerging  markets during late 
1994 and 1995.  For example,  many observers claim that it was Mexi- 
co's  yawning  current account deficit  in 1994 that led to the drying up 
of capital inflows,  and thereby to the collapse of the peso.  Nonetheless, 
countries such as Malaysia  and Thailand ran comparably large current 
account deficits in 1990-94  (as a percentage of GDP) without suffering 
reversals of capital inflows.  Other observers claim that investor panic 
spread contagiously  from Mexico  throughout emerging  markets. This 
story fits well  with the strong adverse market reactions experienced  by 
Argentina  and Brazil  in early  1995,  but not with  the experiences  of 
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neighboring Chile and Colombia,  which witnessed only slight and tran- 
sitory adverse market reactions. 
In this paper, we examine  the financial events  following  the deval- 
uation of the Mexican  peso to uncover new lessons  about the nature of 
financial crises.  We explore  why  some emerging  markets were hit by 
financial  crises  during  1995,  while  others were  not.  To this end,  we 
ask whether there exists  some set of fundamentals that helps to explain 
the variation in financial crises  across countries,  or whether the varia- 
tion just reflects contagion.  We present a simple model identifying three 
factors that determine whether a country is vulnerable to financial crisis: 
a large appreciation of the real exchange  rate, a weak banking system, 
and low  levels  of  foreign  exchange  reserves.  We find that for a set of 
twenty emerging  markets, differences  in these fundamentals go far in 
explaining  the  difference  in the experiences  of  emerging  markets in 
1995.'  We also find that many of the alternative hypotheses  that have 
been put forth to explain  such crises are not supported by the data. 
In our interpretation, Mexico  was subject to a self-fulfilling  specu- 
lative  attack in late December  1994.  While  there were many reasons 
for  a devaluation  of  the  Mexican  peso  at that time,  the  speculative 
attack and the magnitude  of  the resulting  currency depreciation  went 
far beyond  what  was  "inevitable,"  based  on  Mexico's  fundamental 
conditions.2  There is ample evidence  that the attack was,  indeed,  un- 
expected  and represented a self-fulfilling  panic: peso  holders suffered 
extraordinary losses.  Had the peso crisis truly been foreseen (as argued 
recently,  for example,  by Paul Krugman), nominal interest rates would 
have  reflected  this  expectation,  and there would  have  been  no  such 
losses  on peso-denominated  assets.3 
After  the  unexpected  Mexican  crisis,  nervous  investors  looked  at 
other emerging  financial  markets for indications  of  which  currencies 
might be vulnerable to similar attacks. Market expectations had become 
pessimistic,  in the sense that investors expected that their fellow  inves- 
tors would withdraw their funds whenever the fundamentals suggested 
1.  Our sample  includes  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  India,  Indonesia,  Ko- 
rea, Jordan, Malaysia,  Mexico,  Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,  South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Venezuela,  and Zimbabwe.  The selection  of these countries 
is discussed  below. 
2.  We argue this point at length in Sachs,  Tornell,  and Velasco  (1996a). 
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the  possibility  of  a  self-fulfilling  panic.  Therefore  the possibility  of 
panic,  which  had existed  before December  1994,  in several countries 
became thefact  of a panic after December  1994.  Vulnerable countries 
(that is, those with poor fundamentals) that had sustained investor con- 
fidence  and capital  inflows  until  December  1994  suddenly  lost  that 
confidence,  as investors  feared that their fellow  investors  would  lose 
nerve.  Several  of  these  countries,  in turn, succumbed  to  speculative 
panics  in early  1995: for example,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and the Philip- 
pines.  This spreading panic has been dubbed the "Tequila  effect." 
Because  financial  investors  try to  avoid  short-term capital  losses, 
they  flee  from  countries  in  which  they  expect  that a  large  nominal 
exchange  rate depreciation  will  soon  take place.  Thus each  investor 
assesses  the  likelihood  that the  country  will  devalue,  should  capital 
inflows  reverse.  A sudden reduction in the capital account can be met 
by running down  reserves.  However,  if  an external  gap remains,  an 
abrupt reduction in the current account deficit is necessary  to close  it. 
This adjustment can take place  through two  mechanisms:  a fall in ab- 
sorption,  that is,  a reduction in domestic  consumption  or investment; 
or a real exchange  rate depreciation (which,  in the short term, can only 
be achieved by means of a nominal depreciation).  The depreciation will 
be greater the more appreciated is the real exchange rate relative to the 
level  compatible  with lower capital inflows; and also,  the more unwill- 
ing the government  is to endure a recession  due to a period of overval- 
uation and high interest rates. A key determinant of the latter decision 
is the health of  the banking system.  When banks have high bad-loan 
ratios,  a recession  is likely  to generate many bankruptcies. Therefore 
the  weaker  the banking  system,  the  less  likely  the government  is  to 
engineer  a recession. 
Our hypothesis  helps  to  account  for  a subtle  characteristic  of  the 
Tequila effect-it  only reached previously  weakened countries.  Strong 
countries,  with plentiful  foreign exchange  reserves or solid fundamen- 
tals (a real exchange  rate that was not overvalued and a strong banking 
system),  suffered only very short-lived downturns in capital inflows.  In 
contrast, countries with weak fundamentals and scant reserves,  relative 
to their short-term liabilities,  were vulnerable to self-fulfilling  investor 
panics.  As a result,  the shift in expectations  generated by the Mexican 
crisis induced a pessimistic equilibrium in the weak countries. However, 
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tries, panics could not occur there. Our hypothesis does not yield predic- 
tions about the exact timing of financial crises because the framework is 
based on the existence of multiple equilibria in financial markets. 
The  preceding  argument  points  to  three  measures  of  a country's 
"fundamental risk" of a financial crisis in the aftermath of the Mexican 
devaluation.  First, a real exchange  rate appreciation during the capital 
inflow  period,  relative  to past average values,  indicates  a greater risk 
of currency depreciation.  Second,  a very rapid increase in commercial 
bank lending  to the private sector in the years immediately  before the 
1994 crisis  indicates  a greater risk of reversals of investor confidence. 
Presumably,  the prior boom  in bank lending  indicates  greater weak- 
nesses in bank balance sheets and, therefore, more vulnerability. Third, 
when  capital  inflows  suffer  a reversal,  not only  do gross  inflows  dry 
up, but also,  holders of liquid domestic  liabilities  try to convert them 
into  foreign  exchange  and  flee  the  country.  Thus,  as  suggested  by 
Guillermo  Calvo,  reserves  must be compared with a broad measure of 
liquid monetary assets (that can be converted into foreign exchange)  in 
order to determine a country's vulnerability to panic.4 In this paper, we 
consider  the ratio of  M2  (currency plus demand and savings  deposits 
in commercial  banks) to reserves.  If this ratio is high,  a self-fulfilling 
panic among bank depositors  is more likely  to occur.5 
Even  though  M2  includes  the liabilities  of  private banks,  it is the 
relevant  yardstick  with  which  to  assess  reserve  adequacy  because  it 
measures the potential amount of liquid monetary assets that agents can 
convert into foreign exchange.  Consider the scenario of a bank run, in 
which each depositor tries to withdraw funds from the banking system, 
believing  that other depositors  will  do the same.  The run could begin 
as a result of expectations  of a currency devaluation. Once it has started, 
there are two  main courses of  action available to the central bank. To 
permit the withdrawal of funds, it could extend domestic credit to com- 
mercial banks. The withdrawn funds, in turn, would be used to purchase 
foreign exchange,  and the central bank would be forced to sell foreign 
4.  Calvo  (1995). 
5.  In standard models  of the balance of payments,  following  Krugman (1979),  vul- 
nerability to a speculative  attack usually results from a drain of reserves after an exces- 
sive flow  of domestic  credit expansion.  In our view,  a currency can be subject to attack 
even  when domestic  credit policy  is tight,  if the stock of M2 greatly exceeds  the stock 
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exchange reserves, at least until these reserves run out and the domestic 
currency is devalued. Alternatively, the central bank could decide not to 
extend domestic credit, so that the panic would lead to bank defaults and, 
presumably, to a deep contraction in the real economy. In most cases, the 
central bank will not choose to let the banking system implode. Thus the 
threat of devaluation depends on the stock of reserves as compared to the 
stock of credit that must be extended by the central bank in response to 
the panic. This stock of credit, in turn, depends on the level  of M2.  In 
Argentina in 1995 both these extremes were avoided: some domestic credit 
was provided, backed by an emergency international loan.  Devaluation 
was prevented, and the banking sector was (mostly) saved, but still at the 
cost of a sharp contraction of the real economy. 
To test our hypothesis,  we construct a crisis index that is a weighted 
average of the percent change in reserves and the devaluation rate with 
respect  to the U.S.  dollar,  between  November  1994  and each  of  the 
first six  months of  1995.  We find that for our set of twenty emerging 
markets,  a high  ratio of  M2  to reserves,  a high  initial real exchange 
rate,  and a significant  increase  in bank lending  to  the private  sector 
before  1994  all  tend to  increase  the crisis  index  in  1995.  Moreover, 
these three explanatory  variables predict almost 70 percent of the var- 
iation in the crisis  index. 
The literature provides several hypotheses about how capital inflows, 
subsequent  policy  reactions,  and the  vulnerability  of  an economy  to 
shocks  are linked.  For each  hypothesis,  it  is  possible  to  find a few 
country case examples  in support. However,  it is not clear that any one 
can be applied broadly,  to many countries.  Using  multiple regression 
analysis,  we explore  whether any of these hypotheses  helps to explain 
the variability  of  the  crisis  index  in our sample  of  twenty  emerging 
markets, after controlling  for real exchange  rate appreciation,  a bank 
lending  boom,  and the  ratio of  M2  to  reserves.  Because  regression 
analysis cannot incorporate subtle variations in the policy regime or the 
timing of  events  across  countries,  we  focus  in greater depth on eight 
countries  that received  large  capital  inflows  in  1990-94:  Argentina, 
Mexico,  and the Philippines  (which fared badly), and Chile, Colombia, 
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and Thailand (which fared well).6 
6.  A chronology  of monetary and banking policy  events  in these countries  is avail- 
able from the authors upon request. 152  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1.1996 
We find,  first, that the size  of previous  current account deficits,  in 
1994 and before,  does not explain  why a financial crisis did or did not 
occur in 1995.  Second,  the size of earlier capital inflows  (as a share of 
GDP) does not contribute much to explaining the variability in the crisis 
index.  However,  their composition  (short-term versus long-term flows) 
does  explain  part of this variation.  Last,  we find some weak evidence 
that expansionary government spending explains why certain countries 
suffered financial crises. 
The fact that countries with low reserves,  substantial real exchange 
rate appreciation,  and weak banking systems  as of late  1994 were,  on 
average,  more vulnerable to currency attacks in 1995 raises the impor- 
tant question  why  some  countries  experienced  more appreciation and 
greater lending booms than others. We examine this issue with special 
reference to the sample of eight countries mentioned above.  A striking 
fact in the data is that the Latin American countries experienced sharper 
real appreciations than did the East Asian economies.  Some have argued 
that this  was  the  result  of  differences  in the  size  of  capital  inflows; 
others have argued that the variation was due to differences in the extent 
of  the sterilization  of  those  inflows.  Still  others have  argued that the 
explanation lies in whether a country was in the midst of a stabilization 
program,  as well  as  in regional  differences  in the nominal  exchange 
rate policies  adopted; the East Asian economies  pursued more flexible 
nominal  exchange  rate policies  that aimed  at stabilizing  the real ex- 
change  rate. These  simple explanations  account for some,  but not all, 
of the cross-country  variation. Another possibility  is that differences  in 
economic  structure-such  as the existence  of  a large,  labor-intensive 
manufacturing export sector in the East Asian countries,  that makes it 
easy to shift labor to the nontradeables sector-may  account for some 
of the variation in real exchange  rate behavior.  If so,  Latin America's 
distinctive  economic  structure may help to explain the region's  vulner- 
ability to currency attacks. 
We also focus  on why bank lending booms occurred in some coun- 
tries but not in others.  The liberalization  of  the capital account  is an 
often  mentioned  culprit of  financial crisis,  but we  find little  evidence 
to suggest that such liberalization necessarily precedes a lending boom. 
The connection  between  domestic  financial deregulation and the rapid 
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our group of eight countries  and more broadly, domestic  financial lib- 
eralization  that is  not  coupled  with  enhanced  prudential supervision 
seems  to lead to a sharp expansion  in lending by both banks and non- 
bank financial institutions,  and (often,  but not always) eventually,  to a 
financial crash. The recent experience  of Mexico,  and to a lesser extent 
Argentina,  is instructive in this respect. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we present a 
theoretical model that brings together our three fundamentals to deter- 
mine the circumstances  in which multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling 
currency attacks can occur. We show that multiple equilibria arise when 
real appreciation and current sensitivity to recession (possibly as a result 
of  a previous  boom  in bank lending)  are within  a certain range,  and 
foreign reserves are low.  We then test the model empirically  and show 
that financial crises occurred only in countries with weak fundamentals 
and low  foreign  exchange  reserves,  relative  to M2.  We  next pit our 
approach against some popular alternatives,  and find them wanting on 
the basis of cross-country  experiences.  We then turn to real exchange 
rate behavior,  and ask why appreciations took place in some countries 
and not in others. We also examine the genesis  of lending booms in our 
sample of eight Latin American and East Asian countries,  and consider 
the  possible  connection  between  the differences  in their origins  and 
cross-country  differences  in policy.  Finally,  we draw conclusions  and 
suggest  some areas for future work. 
Explaining the Tequila Effect 
Does  the extent  of exchange  rate devaluation  and losses  of foreign 
exchange  reserves  across emerging  markets merely reflect contagion, 
or does  it reflect  differences  in fundamentals? If one  conditions  on a 
large shock having taken place in December  1994,  can one predict the 
extent of financial crises across emerging markets by using a parsimon- 
ious model based on precrisis information? 
To  answer  these  questions,  consider  an investor  trying  to  decide 
whether to buy financial assets  in an emerging  market during a period 
of turbulence and possible  flow reversals.  For a given  nominal return, 
the real return can be adversely  affected  by a large depreciation,  the 154  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
imposition  of capital controls,  or outright expropriation,  among other 
factors. Even if the "bad"  policy  that causes the capital loss is viewed 
as transitory, a diversified international investor, wary of the heightened 
uncertainty and able to relocate  resources  at relatively  low  cost,  typi- 
cally  will  park his or her wealth elsewhere  until the dust settles.  Usu- 
ally,  when panic sets in and capital inflows  suffer a reversal,  not only 
do gross  inflows  dry up,  but also the government,  unable to roll over 
short-term debt,  may have to amortize obligations  to foreigners earlier 
than anticipated.  The net effect  is a massive  transfer of resources  out 
of the country. 
At this point the government  is confronted with unpleasant choices. 
By letting the exchange  rate depreciate,  it could inflict a capital loss on 
international investors and reduce the magnitude of the required transfer 
of  resources.  In  addition,  if  the  capital  inflow  has been  financing  a 
current account deficit,  this deficit has to be reduced abruptly in order 
to close  the external gap. This adjustment could take place through one 
of two mechanisms:  either by generating a recession  and reducing ab- 
sorption; or by generating a real exchange rate depreciation that would 
induce a transfer of resources from the nontradeables to the tradeables 
sector,  thus improving  the current account.  Since  prices  are sticky  in 
the short run, a sudden and large real exchange  rate depreciation  can 
be  achieved  only  by  means  of  a nominal  depreciation.  But an unex- 
pected nominal depreciation will cause capital losses for financial inves- 
tors; they  would  prefer that the adjustment take place  through higher 
unemployment. 
The  actual policy  mix  that is  adopted (that is,  devaluation  versus 
recession)  depends  on the preferences  of  the government  and on the 
constraints that it faces.  First, the more appreciated the real exchange 
rate is (relative  to the level  that would close  the external gap) and the 
less responsive  tradeables are to changes  in the real exchange  rate, the 
greater  is  the  nominal  depreciation  necessary  to  reduce  the  current 
account deficit to the level  compatible with lower capital inflows.  Sec- 
ond, the more vulnerable a country is to a sudden contraction in aggre- 
gate demand, the less likely  its government is to choose  recession  over 
depreciation  as the method of  adjustment. No country relishes  a con- 
traction in absorption and the recession  that is likely  to accompany it, 
but some countries are better prepared to face this prospect than others. 
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domestic  banks.7 A  healthy  banking  system  may  be  able  to  resist  a 
recession  that would  destroy  a weaker system  with widespread  bank- 
ruptcy  and the  associated  economic  disruption.  The  recent  Mexican 
episode  clearly  suggests  that it  was  worries  about the  health  of  the 
banks (and about the political  repercussions  that bankruptcies would 
bring in an election  year) that prevented the central bank from raising 
interest rates high enough to stop the drain of reserves over the course 
of  1994. 
It follows  that for a given  level  of international liquidity,  the coun- 
tries in which financial investors are most likely to experience  a capital 
loss due to a nominal devaluation  are those where the real exchange  is 
appreciated and the banking system  is weak.  We refer to this combi- 
nation as "weak  fundamentals."  If investors do not invest in a country 
with weak fundamentals,  then the government will  implement a sharp 
nominal devaluation  in order to bring about the necessary  adjustment 
in the external  accounts,  thus justifying  investors'  expectations.  This 
does not occur in countries with sufficiently  strong fundamentals. 
Consider,  though, the role of different levels  of international liquid- 
ity, or more specifically,  the size of a country's gross reserves relative 
to its short-term debt. Ceteris paribus, the larger the stock of obligations 
that cannot  be rolled  over  in the event  of  a crisis  (such  as Mexico's 
short-term dollar-denominated debt, the infamous cetes and tesobonos), 
the  larger  the  required  adjustment.  Countries  differ  widely  in  their 
levels  of international liquidity.  Thus if a country has weak fundamen- 
tals but high net reserves ratios,  it is possible  that a reversal in capital 
inflows  will  not  induce  a devaluation  because  the government  might 
simply run down reserves.  Understanding this,  investors  may not fear 
a capital loss when reserves ratios are high. Therefore a financial crisis 
need not take place  in such a country. 
A Minimal Model 
In order to refine the above  argument and clarify our use of terms, 
we present a minimal  model.  The model  is static,  with simple behav- 
ioral assumptions for investors and the government,  rather than behav- 
ior derived  from  first principles.  It also  disregards the intertemporal 
7.  See  Rojas-Suarez  and  Weisbrod  (1995),  Gavin  and  Hausmann  (1995),  and 
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aspects  of both individual  behavior  (the consumption-savings  choice) 
and government  behavior  (public  debt  management).  Given  that we 
focus on situations of potential credit rationing, in which intertemporal 
choices  are limited  at best,  little is lost with this simplification.8 
Consider  a government  that is  managing  a pegged  exchange  rate, 
with nominal exchange  rate E0 (domestic  currency per unit of foreign 
currency)  and  real  exchange  rate E0IP,  where  P  is  the  ratio  of  the 
domestic  price level  to the foreign  price level,  which  is taken as pre- 
determined  in the short term.  For simplicity,  we  set P  equal to one. 
The  government  pegs  the exchange  rate as long  as foreign  exchange 
reserves, R, are sufficient to finance a net capital outflow, K. Thus there 
is no devaluation  as long  as K '  R.  In the event that K >  R,  a deval- 
uation  occurs.  Then  the  government  establishes  a  new  nominal  ex- 
change rate, El,  in order to achieve  a target real exchange  rate. Thus 
the next-period  exchange  rate, E,  equals Eo when K ?  R,  and equals 
El  when K >  R. We denote the size of the devaluation as D  =  (E/ IE0) 
-  1.  Thus  D  equals  zero  when  K  '  R,  and equals  (ET  -  E10)IE 
otherwise. 
The  target  ET  reflects  a host  of  structural variables  (the  terms of 
trade, the degree of trade and financial liberalization,  and expectations 
of future long-term capital flows,  among others). In addition, the target 
exchange  rate must reflect the health of the banking system.  When the 
banking sector is basically  sound,  the government will  set ET  at e,  the 
long-run real exchange  rate (recalling  that P  =  1). When the banking 
sector is in crisis,  however,  the government will  tend to choose  a real 
exchange rate more depreciated than e, since it will not want to maintain 
high interest rates in order to defend the exchange rate. This is because 
the  recessionary  effects  of  high  interest  rates  are likely  to  generate 
widespread  bankruptcies  among  banks when  they  are weak.9 Below, 
we judge  banking  sector  vulnerability  in terms of  whether or not the 
economy  has experienced  a lending boom (LB) immediately before the 
period under examination,  on the grounds that this will  be associated 
8.  The model is similar, in spirit, to models of speculative  attacks with multiple 
equilibria,  such as those of Calvo (1995); Obstfeld  (1994); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 
(1996b); and Velasco (1995). 
9.  If the domestic  banking  system also has large  stocks of liabilities  denominated  in 
domestic currency, the government  may choose to "help" banks by engineering a 
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with a weaker overall bank portfolio.  The target real exchange rate may 
therefore be written as 
(1)  E1T =  e f(LB),  f'(LB) >  0,  f(O) =  1. 
Thus the potential course of the exchange rate can be summarized as 
E )f(LB)  -  I  if K >  R 
(2)  D  =t(EO 
t0  if K '  R. 
According  to equation 2,  a devaluation occurs when there is a capital 
outflow  in  excess  of  reserve  levels.  The  size  of  the  devaluation  is 
greatest when either the exchange  rate is initially  appreciated relative 
to its long-run average, so that elE0 is high; or there has been a preceding 
boom in bank lending,  so that f(LB) is large. 
The possibility  of  multiple  equilibria  arises because  capital move- 
ments depend on anticipated exchange rate behavior. There is a peculiar 
circularity here: the devaluation  depends on a capital outflow,  but the 
capital outflow depends on the expectation of a devaluation. As a simple 
illustration,  suppose  that there  are N  small  investors  who  each  hold 
assets,  k, in the banking system of the country. In the event that all of 
the investors  try to flee the country with all of their funds,  the size  of 
the incipient  capital outflow  would be K  =  Nk. The investors'  rule is 
simple: withdraw funds in the event that a devaluation,  D,  is expected 
to exceed  a percentage,  0, and maintain funds in the country as long as 
D is expected  to be less than or equal to 0. The most obvious  rationale 
for this lower bound is as follows.  Suppose that the investors own bonds 
denominated  in domestic  currency. They will  be willing  to hold these 
bonds as long as an expected  devaluation is lower than the differential 
between  domestic  and foreign interest rates. 
Thus for investor j, 
(3)  k  =  I  j 
(3)  kj  ( ~~~~k  if D  >  03. 
By symmetry,  total capital outflows  are 
(4)  K  O  f D 
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Consider two alternative cases.  On the one hand, suppose that fun- 
damentals  are healthy,  in the  sense  that (elE,)  x  f(LB)  -  1 c  0.  10 
When  this  condition  applies,  any  devaluation-if  there  was  one- 
would be smaller than the investors'  threshold for capital flight. There- 
fore,  even  in the event  of  a devaluation,  K  =  0.  Since  K  =  0  <  R, 
there would not be a devaluation  in this case,  according to equation 2. 
On the other hand, suppose that fundamentals are unhealthy,  in the 
sense that (elE,)  x  [f(LB)  -  1] >  0. In this case,  a devaluation would 
be  larger than the  investors'  threshold  for  moving  funds  out  of  the 
country. Therefore K would equal Nk if a devaluation did in fact occur; 
but would a devaluation  occur? If K  =  Nk <  R, then it would not: the 
government would be able to defend the exchange rate against a capital 
outflow.  If K  =  Nk >  R,  however,  a devaluation might or might not 
occur. If each investor expects  exchange rate stability (that is, D equals 
zero),  then each keeps k equal to zero,  and no devaluation occurs.  But 
if each investor expects  a devaluation,  however,  then K =  Nk >  R and 
D  >  0.  Therefore  there  is  a  region  of  multiple  equilibria  where  a 
devaluation  may become  a self-fulfilling  prophecy.'' 
To summarize,  a balance of payments crisis and a devaluation (D > 
0) are possible  only  if 
(5)  (If(LB)  -  1 >  0 and R <  Nk. 
E,, 
Returning  to  the  question  whether  the  Tequila  effect  was  due  to 
contagion  or fundamentals,  the model  suggests  that if  a country had 
weak fundamentals (that is, real exchange  rate appreciation, or a weak 
banking  system,  or  both)  in  addition  to  low  levels  of  international 
liquidity,  it was the likely  victim  of a currency crisis.  The shock may 
simply have hastened the demise of the policy  regime.  If a country had 
very strong fundamentals,  then the Tequila effect  would likely  pass it 
10.  If the real exchange  rate is not overvalued  and banks are not bankrupt, (elE,)  x 
f(LB)  -  I could  be very close  to zero.  Therefore the condition  (elE,)  x  f(LB)  -  I c 
0 could be satisfied even  if 0 is small. 
I 1.  One way to overcome  the multiple equilibria would be for a single  lender to lend 
an overall  amount that is greater than or equal to R, thereby preventing the expectation 
of devaluation  from becoming  self-fulfilling.  This  is generally  impossible  with inflows 
to an entire country,  because  such  inflows  tend to be much larger than the amount of 
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by or,  at worst,  cause  a temporary decline  in asset prices  that would 
soon be reversed,  leaving  little or no trace behind. 
Empirics 
Our theoretical  model  suggests  that the countries that are most vul- 
nerable to a reversal of capital inflows are those with weak fundamentals 
(a weak banking system,  or an overvalued real exchange  rate, or both) 
and low reserves  relative to their liquid liabilities.  These countries are 
more likely  to respond to a capital outflow with a nominal devaluation 
than countries  with  strong fundamentals,  thus validating  the fears of 
investors.  Therefore a negative shock like the Mexican crisis of Decem- 
ber 1994 is more likely to be contagious between such countries. In this 
section we show that the Mexican crisis did not spread randomly across 
emerging  markets  in  1995.  The  crisis  affected  countries  with  weak 
fundamentals  and  low  reserve  ratios,  but  not  countries  with  strong 
fundamentals or high reserve ratios. 
We measure the extent of financial crisis in 1995 with a crisis index 
(denoted IND) that measures pressures on the foreign exchange market. 
IND  is a weighted  average of the devaluation  rate with respect to the 
U.S.  dollar  and the percentage  change  in foreign  exchange  reserves 
between the end of November  1994 and the end of each of the first six 
months of  1995.  For each country, the two series have different vola- 
tilities.  Accordingly,  the weights  that we apply to each series for each 
country are given  by the relative precision of each series over the past 
ten years.  2 The rationale for this index is as follows.  If capital inflows 
reverse,  the government can let the exchange  rate depreciate.  Alterna- 
tively,  it  can  defend  the  currency  by  running down  reserves  or by 
increasing  interest  rates.  Since  there are no reliable  and comparable 
cross-country  interest rate data, we construct the index using levels  of 
reserves  and exchange  rates. The values  for IND are listed  in table  1. 
12.  Similar indexes  have been used by Eichengreen,  Rose,  and Wyplosz  (1995)  for 
the case  of Europe,  by Frankel and Rose  (1996)  to study currency crises  in developing 
countries,  and by Kaminsky  and Reinhart (1996)  to study banking and balance of pay- 
ments crises.  Barro (1995)  and Calvo  and Reinhart (forthcoming)  use the stock market 
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Table 1. Crisis and Financial Indicators 
Percentage change, except where indicated 
Lending 
Crisis index'  Real depreciation"  boom"  Reserves adequacy" 
Country  (IND)  (RER)  (LB)  (M21R) 
Argentina  20.2  -48.0  57.1  3.6 
Brazil  17.7  -29.6  68.3  3.6 
Chile  -5.7  -7.5  13.3  1.4 
Colombia  4.2  9.2  20.5  1.5 
India  -1.2  43.0  -3.1  6.3 
Indonesia  1.3  11.8  0.7  4.6 
Jordan  -1.5  35.5  4.2  2.5 
Korea  -3.7  -10.3  8.4  6.5 
Malaysia  -2.6  9.8  4.0  2.1 
Mexico  79.1  -28.5  116.2  9.1 
Pakistan  0.7  20.4  -7.7  6.6 
Peru  -2.9  -45.4  156.1  1.5 
Philippines  7.2  -6.7  50.0  4.1 
South Africa  1.1  -6.8  8.1  21.5 
Sri Lanka  0.7  1.2  28.9  2.0 
Taiwan  4.4  16.2  46.0  4.7 
Thailand  -1.8  0.2  39.2  3.7 
Turkey  -2.5  -12.1  -32.8  3.2 
Venezuela  7.6  16.2  -  38.5  1.4 
Zimbabwe  1.6  44.2  55.7  2.6 
Source: See appendix A. 
a. The crisis index (IND) is a weighted average of the exchange rate devaluation rate with respect to the U.S.  dollar and 
the percentage change in foreign exchange reserves between November 1994 and April 1995. Because the two series have 
different volatilities,  the weights applied to each series (for each country) are given by the relative precision (the inverse of 
the variance) of each series over the past ten years. 
b. Real depreciation of the exchange rate (RER) is the percentage point change in the real exchange rate index between 
the average of  1986-89  and the average of  1990-94.  The real exchange rate index is a weighted sum of bilateral exchange 
rates (using  domestic  and foreign (CPI) vis-a-vis  the dollar,  the DM,  and the yen).  The weights sum to one and are 
proportional to a country's bilateral trade share with the United States, the European  Union, and Japan. Note that a positive 
(negative) value of RER signifies that the real exchange rate is depreciated (appreciated), relative to the base period. 
c. Lending boom (LB) is the percentage change between 1990 and 1994 in the ratio of the size of the claims of the banking 
sector (demand deposit banks and monetary authorities) on the private sector to GDP. 
d. Reserve adequacy (M2IR) is the ratio of the broad measure of the money stock, M2, to the stock of foreign exchange 
reserves in November 1994. 
A higher value of IND means a higher devaluation or a greater fall in 
reserves:  in other words,  a more severe Tequila effect. 
We also construct measures of real exchange  rate misalignment  and 
excessive  bank lending.  We construct a real exchange  rate index as a 
weighted  sum of bilateral real exchange  rates (using domestic  and for- 
eign  CPIs) in relation to the dollar,  the deutsche mark (DM),  and the 
yen.  The  weights  sum  to  one  and are proportional to  the  country's 
bilateral trade shares with the United States, the European Union (EU), 
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ment  by  measuring  the  percentage  change  in the real exchange  rate 
index from the average of  1986-89  to the average of  1990-94.'  This 
change variable is termed RER. A positive  value of RER signifies  that 
the real exchange  rate is depreciated relative to the base period,  while 
a negative  value  signifies  appreciation relative to the base period.  We 
expect  that the Tequila effect  will  strike countries with a low value of 
RER. Although this way of measuring misalignment  is common  in the 
literature, it has serious shortcomings,  such as not controlling for long- 
run productivity  changes  or terms-of-trade  shocks  that can  shift  the 
long-run value of RER. 4 In defense  of our approach, we are trying to 
identify  countries  that experienced  extreme  overvaluations  during  a 
span of four years. If our index indicates a real appreciation of the order 
of  30 to 60  percent,  it is very unlikely  that this was caused by a pro- 
ductivity  shock  as opposed  to  a misalignment.  The  values  for  the 
percentage  change  in  the real exchange  rate index  are also  listed  in 
table  1. 
The weakness  of the banking sector cannot be assessed  directly,  by 
comparing ratios of nonperforming loans to total assets,  because,  to the 
best of our knowledge,  there exists  no broad cross-country set of com- 
parable bank  balance  sheets.  Hence  we  rely  instead  on  an  indirect 
measure of the vulnerability  of the financial system: the magnitude of 
the increase in bank lending between  1990 and 1994. We presume that 
when bank lending expands very sharply during a short period of time, 
banks'  ability  to  screen  marginal projects  declines,  so  that they  are 
more likely  to end up with  a large share of  weak  borrowers in their 
portfolios.  High risk areas, such as credit cards and consumer and real 
estate loans,  tend to grow disproportionately in such lending booms.  In 
addition,  particularly  in  developing  countries,  the  limited  oversight 
capacity  of  the regulators is soon overwhelmed.  Thus a bank lending 
boom  is likely  to produce a banking sector portfolio that is extremely 
13. We take the average  of the real exchange rate from 1990-94 as the end point, 
instead  of the rate in 1994, in order  to capture  the idea that in a country  that  has had an 
overappreciated  currency  for a longer period, firms in the tradeable  sector are more 
likely to have exited. Thus the longer the period of real appreciation,  the greater  the 
real exchange rate devaluation  needed to bring  about  a given improvement  in the trade 
balance. Moreover, none of the twenty countries in our sample, except Venezuela, 
experienced  a sharp  nominal  depreciation  during  the first  eleven months  of 1994. 
14. In the case of Mexico, Warner  (1996) computes  the equilibrium  exchange rate 
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vulnerable to the vagaries of the business  cycle. 15  To identify cases  of 
lending boom,  we first measure the size of the banking sector's  claims 
on the private sector, BIGDP, where B denotes bank loans to the private 
sector.  (We include the claims  of demand deposit banks and monetary 
authorities.)'6  We then look  at the percentage change  in this ratio be- 
tween  1990  and  1994,  which  we  denote  as  LB  =  [(BIGDP),9941 
(B/GDP)990]  -  1. We assume that countries with a very large increase 
in bank lending  are cases  of lending  booms  (LB high),  and therefore, 
vulnerable banking sectors.  The values for LB are listed in table  1. 
If, in a time of capital inflow reversal, the central bank is not willing 
to let the exchange  rate suffer a sharp depreciation,  it must be prepared 
to cover all its liquid liabilities  with reserves.  These liabilities  include 
not only direct liabilities-the  monetary base-but  also the liquid lia- 
bilities  of commercial  banks,  which can be withdrawn quickly.  If the 
central bank does  not intervene  in a run on banks, bankruptcies could 
easily  follow.  Given the well-documented  aversion of governments  to 
bank bankruptcies,  the larger the liquid bank liabilities,  the larger the 
contingent  claims  on the central bank. Therefore,  as argued by Calvo, 
the correct yardstick with which to evaluate the abundance of reserves 
is a broad measure of money,  such as M2,  compared with the stock of 
foreign  exchange  reserves.  In the empirical analysis below  we use the 
ratio of M2 to foreign exchange  reserves (M21R) in November  1994 as 
the indicator of reserve adequacy. The values for this ratio are listed in 
the last column of table  1. 
Since we are interested in countries that were exposed to international 
capital flows,  we consider the countries in the Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook  of  the International Finance  Corporation. This  sample con- 
sists  of the emerging  markets in which foreigners can invest in stocks 
and other financial instruments with relative freedom. We exclude tran- 
sition economies  (China,  Hungary, and Poland),  countries that belong 
to the EU (Greece  and Portugal),  and Nigeria,  for which there are no 
data available  for claims  on the private sector.  Our resulting  sample 
consists of twenty countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, 
Indonesia,  Korea, Jordan, Malaysia,  Mexico,  Pakistan, Peru, the Phil- 
15. See Rojas-Suarez  and Weisbrod  (1995) and Gavin and Hausmann  (1995). 
16. We do not include nonbank  financial institutions  because these data are not 
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ippines,  South  Africa,  Sri Lanka,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Vene- 
zuela,  and Zimbabwe. 
To compute  the real exchange  rate indexes,  we calculate  the trade 
weights from the Direction  of Trade Statistics of the International Mon- 
etary Fund (IMF).  For the countries with multiple exchange  rates, we 
obtain data on parallel exchange  rates from the World Currency Year- 
book and the Country Reports on Economic Policy  and Trade Practices 
published annually by the U.S.  Congress.  The rest of the data are from 
the International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  cd-rom.  For the cases  in 
which  data are missing  from the IFS,  we  use current country sources 
and the Recent Economic Developments  country studies from the IMF. 
In each case,  we check that the data are compatible  with the available 
IFS data. 
As shown above,  if a country has a strong banking sector and a real 
exchange  rate that is not very overvalued,  then even  if capital inflows 
were to reverse,  expected  depreciation  would  be below  the threshold 
that induces investors to flee from the country. Therefore when a coun- 
try has sound fundamentals,  investors  will  not attack it.  Similarly,  if 
fundamentals are weak but M21R is low,  there will not be a speculative 
attack. In other words,  a speculative  crisis arises only when both fun- 
damentals and reserves  are vulnerable. 
To implement the model,  we classify  countries as strong or weak on 
fundamentals  and reserves  by ranking them with regard to RER, LB, 
and M21R. We first use a broad classification,  under which most coun- 
tries  are deemed  to  be  in the  region  where  a self-fulfilling  attack is 
possible.  We  then restrict the definition,  so  that fewer  countries  are 
classified  as being in the vulnerable region,  and observe-how the results 
change  as  we  alter the classification.  In the broader classification,  a 
country has strong fundamentals if its real depreciation is in the highest 
quartile  of  the  sample  and  its  bank  lending  boom  is  in  the  lowest 
quartile. Otherwise,  a country has weak fundamentals and is presumed 
to be vulnerable to a self-fulfilling  attack. We create a dummy variable 
for weak fundamentals,  such that DWF  is equal to one for weak funda- 
mentals and equal to zero for strong fundamentals. Similarly,  a country 
has high foreign  exchange  reserves  if its ratio of M2 to reserves  is in 
the lowest  quartile of the sample.  Otherwise,  we consider its reserves 
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DLR,  is  equal  to  one  for  countries  above  the bottom  quartile for the 
money-to-reserves  ratio and equal to zero otherwise. 
These definitions of DWF  and DLR  cast a wide net. They deem thirteen 
of the twenty countries vulnerable to a self-fulfilling  reversal of capital 
inflow: Argentina,  Brazil,  Indonesia,  Jordan, Korea,  Malaysia,  Mex- 
ico, the Philippines,  South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zim- 
babwe.  The seven  countries deemed not vulnerable are Chile,  Colom- 
bia,  India,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Sri  Lanka,  and Venezuela.  Below,  we 
consider increasingly  stringent definitions of the two dummy variables 
and show that our results are relatively  robust to this modification. 
The basic equation regresses  the crisis index,  IND,  on the levels  of 
RER and LB,  taking  into  account  the  strength or weakness  of  these 
fundamentals and the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves. The main 
idea is that the effects  of RER and LB on IND should be nonlinear, and 
should  be  large  only  when  both  DWF  and DLR  are equal  to  one.  We 
implement  this idea by estimating  the equation in the following  form: 
IND  =  J3 +  2(RER) +  3(LB)  +  34(DLR  x  RER) 
+  35(DLR  X  LB)  +  36(DLR  x  DwF  X  RER) 
+  37(DLR  x  DWF  X  LB)  +  E. 
The coefficients  f2  and  33 capture the effects  of the fundamentals on 
the crisis  index  in countries  with high reserves  (DLR  =  0)  and strong 
fundamentals  (DWF  =  0).  According  to our model,  these  coefficients 
should be zero.  The effects  of the fundamentals on the crisis  index in 
countries with low reserves (DLR  =  1) but strong fundamentals  (DWF 
=  0)  are given  by  32 +  34 and  33  +  35.  Our model again predicts 
that J2  +  I4  =  33  +  J5  =  0.  That is,  countries with strong funda- 
mentals are not likely to suffer an attack, even if they have low reserves. 
Last,  32 +  34  +  16  and 13  +  J5  +  37 capture the effects  of the 
fundamentals  on  the  crisis  index  in countries  with  low  reserves  and 
weak fundamentals.  In these  countries,  we expect  ,B2 +  34  +  ,B6 to 
be negative:  a more devalued real exchange  rate as of November  1994 
should lead to a smaller value of IND in 1995.  Conversely,  we expect 
,B3 +  ,B5 +  ,B7  to be positive:  a larger bank lending boom should lead 
to a larger value of IND in 1995. 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression as we vary the terminal 
month  of  the  dependent  variable  over  a period  of  six  months  (from ?N 
)  r-- 
t- 
r 
t  (f)  (f  (f 
i  o6 
- 
6  CO CO  C- 
'  m  ; 
os~~~~~~~~C  _-  rs  0rs  r  r  -  m  m  011  o  0  u  :  u:m_  o  1= 
w  f}  r-o  )-  -  o,  ?  Pt  -o  O  O  O  O0,r 
4n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~zC 
Cn oN  >  >  >  >  m  m  >  >  t  m  q~~~~00  C  00 tf  00  -004  -1  W-  )2  .2  q 
o  _  -  m  Csv  t-  t-  t-  o)  o  0S  "C  r-  tf  O  t-to C)  o  ,  C 
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0  C\  m  ?N  O  ,C  ?m  -  W)  m  OOO  :rn 
t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"  C.t 
Sv  .  >  ?  ?  ~  O  ?  N  ?  N  ~ 00  t  OO  O  "CO  ZO  .-  _ 
Q 
2 <  ?<3  ?<3~~~~~~~~~~~ 
"C _ l  ItI_  3= 
c;~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~  "C W)  e0  c 
>  22  I  c  o  <~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IIt-' 
su  oZ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
u~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c  u  LwC 
z~~~  <=  =  =  =  1 166  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
January through June 1995). The relative effects  on the three categories 
of  countries  just  described  are as expected.  The  sign  of  each  set  of 
coefficients  stays  constant  across  the  six  cases.  In order to  evaluate 
alternative  hypotheses  regarding the causes  of  financial crises  in the 
next  section,  we  use  as  a benchmark the crisis  index  for  the period 
November  1994 through April  1995.  For countries with low  reserves 
and weak fundamentals, RER and LB enter the regression equation with 
the expected  signs: the point estimate of  32  +  ,B4 +  36 is  -  2.65,  and 
that of ,B3 +  35  +  ,B7 is 3.83.  Wald tests indicate that the hypotheses 
that 32  +  P4  +  36  =  0 and P3  +  ,35 +  ,B7 =  0 can be rejected at 
the  10 percent  significance  level  (their p  values  are 0.07  and 0.04, 
respectively).  As can be seen from the table, these hypotheses can also 
be rejected for the periods from November through March and Novem- 
ber through May. As expected,  RER and LB do not affect the likelihood 
of an attack in countries with low reserves but strong fundamentals: the 
estimates of ,B2 +  ,B4  and ,B3 +  ,35 are not significantly different from 
zero at the  10 percent significance  level  (Wald tests of the hypotheses 
,B2 +  1X4  =  0 and ,B3 +  3 5  =  0 have associated p values of 0.72  and 
0.12,  respectively).  The same is true for the other five periods.  Last, 
in contrast to the zero values that we would expect,  the estimates of ,B2 
and ,B3  are positive  and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
and 10 percent level,  respectively,  for the periods ending in April, May, 
and June. These  estimates  correspond to the four countries with high 
reserves  in our sample (Chile,  Colombia,  Sri Lanka, and Venezuela). 
The regression  results support the idea that the level  of central bank 
reserves,  relative  to short-term liabilities,  is important in determining 
whether a country is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling  panic. An interesting 
case  in point  is  the comparison  of  Mexico  and Peru.  Both  countries 
experienced  a sharp real appreciation (29 percent and 45  percent,  re- 
spectively)  and a lending  boom (116 percent and 156 percent,  respec- 
tively),  but only Mexico  scores high on the crisis index. The difference 
is that Peru did not have low foreign exchange reserves,  relative to M2. 
Specifically,  in Peru the ratio of M2 to reserves was only  1.4,  while in 
Mexico  the ratio was 9. 1. 
Table 2 shows  that during the first six months of  1995,  between  51 
percent and 71 percent of the variation in the crisis index was explained 
by  movements  in the real exchange  rate,  the  lending  boom,  and the 
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crisis  was  mainly  contagious  to countries  with  low  reserves  that had 
experienced real exchange rate appreciations, or steep increases in bank 
lending to the private sector,  or both, during 1990-94. 
If  we  fit a simpler  equation  that uses  only  a dummy  variable  for 
foreign exchange  reserves,  instead of the equations presented in table 
2,  we  obtain  similar  results.  For the  period  from  November  1994 
through April  1995,  the fitted equation (with standard errors in paren- 
theses)  is 
IND  -  -18.29  -  1.93(RER) +  3.66(LB) 
(28.39)  (1.12)  (1.65) 
+7.06(RER  x  DHR)  -  2.36(LB  x  DHR),  R2  =  0. 65. 
(2.42)  (1.39) 
To make the interpretation easier,  we  use a dummy variable for high 
reserves,  DHR  =  1  -  DLR.  It follows that the coefficients on RER  and 
LB correspond  to  countries  with  low  reserves.  Thus the  second  and 
third coefficients  show that in such countries,  a higher real appreciation 
and a larger lending boom increase the crisis index. 
The regression  results are robust to changes  in the definition of the 
dummy variables.  Table 3 presents the regression  results for different 
definitions  of the dummies.  The sign and significance  of the estimates 
of  P2  +  43, j3  +  15,  j2  +  j4  +  P6,  and P3  +  j5  +  j7  remain 
the same as in the benchmark equation if we add one or two countries 
to each of the high reserves  group,  the low  lending boom group,  and 
the low  appreciation  group.  If we  add three more countries  to these 
groups, the only change is that the estimate of j2  +  j4  +  36  becomes 
insignificant.  Also,  the  results  are not  affected  if  we  eliminate  one 
country from each  of  the high reserves  group,  the low  lending  boom 
group, and the low  appreciation group. 
Moreover,  our regression  results are not driven by a single  country. 
Table  4  presents  the  regression  results  when  we  eliminate  from  the 
sample one country at a time out of those with the largest changes  in 
their crisis  indexes.  In each case,  the sign and significance  of the esti- 
mates of 12  +  14,  13  +  15,  12  +  14  +  16,  and 13  +  15  +  17 
remain essentially  the same as in the benchmark equation. 
It is interesting  to note that the percentage  change  in M21GDP be- 
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variable  (LB,  measured  as  the  percentage  change  in BIGDP).  If  we 
replace  our lending  boom  variable  by  the percentage  change  in M21 
GDP  in the benchmark regression,  the point estimate  of  ,B2 +  ,B4 + 
36 would be negative  but insignificantly  different from zero. The point 
estimate  of  ,B3 +  ,35  +  ,B7 would  be positive  but insignificantly  dif- 
ferent from zero.  Moreover,  the R2 statistic for this regression is 0.29, 
down from 0.69  in the regression using the lending boom variable. This 
reflects  the  fact  that M21GDP  is  a broader measure  of  liquidity  (or 
financial deepening)  that need not be correlated with the degree of bank 
vulnerability.  Bank vulnerability seems to play the more important role 
in determining a country's  vulnerability to crisis in  1995. 
The finding that a high ratio of M2 to reserves is helpful in predicting 
the extent of a financial crisis  lends some support to the Calvo hypoth- 
esis that central banks implicitly  must be prepared to defend currencies 
against the overall  stock of liquid monetary assets.  A high ratio of M2 
to  reserves  makes  countries  more  vulnerable  to  speculative  attacks. 
Similarly,  the finding that real exchange rate appreciation increases the 
likelihood  of  a financial crisis  echoes  the argument of Rudiger Dorn- 
busch,  Ilan  Goldfajn,  and  Rodrigo  Valdes. '  However,  this  finding 
should be qualified: the real exchange  rate only  has a powerful  effect 
when a country's  reserves  are low,  relative to the stock of money. 
Other Possible Determinants of Financial Crises 
There are several  alternative hypotheses  in the literature regarding 
the vulnerability of an economy to capital flow reversals. Many of these 
are supported by case-study  comparisons  of  the experiences  of  a few 
countries,  but their broader applicability is less clear. In what follows, 
we  consider  a handful  of  these  hypotheses  and evaluate  their broad 
explanatory power.  First, using multiple regression analysis,  we check 
whether any of them help to explain the variability of IND,  after con- 
trolling for RER, LB, and M21R. Second,  we compare their predictions 
with  the experiences  of  eight  countries:  Argentina,  Mexico,  and the 
Philippines  (which fared badly); and Chile,  Colombia,  Indonesia,  Ma- 
laysia,  and Thailand (which fared well). 
17.  Dornbusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes  (1995). Jeffrey D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco  171 
Excessive  Capital Inflows Make a Financial  Crisis More Likely 
In its simplest form, this view argues that what comes in must even- 
tually  go  out: large capital  inflows  today  may (but need  not)  lead to 
large outflows  tomorrow.  Its implications  are weighty  if,  as argued by 
Calvo,  Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen Reinhart among others, cap- 
ital flows are largely exogenous  to emerging markets, so that a sudden 
flight  may  be  triggered  by  circumstances  far beyond  policymakers' 
control.'8  Some  developing  economies  (for  example,  Korea  in  the 
1960s) have taken in large amounts of foreign capital over long periods 
of time with few harmful effects,  but it is alleged that this occurred in 
periods of  much more stable capital flows.  In today's  world of  fickle 
private capital movements,  it is argued,  large inflows  leave  a country 
exposed  to the latest mood of Wall Street traders. 
To explore whether this view is supported by the data, we add to our 
benchmark regression  the average ratio of capital inflows to GDP from 
1990 to  1994,  alone  and interacted with the low reserves  dummy and 
the low reserves  and weak fundamentals dummy (we denote the corre- 
sponding coefficients  by 138, 139,  and ,B10, respectively).  We estimate 
this regression  imposing  two restrictions: 132 +  134  =  0 and 133  +  135 
=  0.  As  can be seen  from table 5,  the estimates  of  138, 139,  and 1310 
are insignificant.  Moreover,  we cannot reject the null hypotheses  that 
138 +  139  =  0 and 138 +  139  +  P130 =  0.  We obtain the same results 
when we include the percentage change in capital inflows as a share of 
GDP  between  1990  and  1994  (table  6).  Thus,  if  the level  of  capital 
inflows influences the likelihood  of financial crisis,  it probably does not 
do so directly,  but rather, by affecting  the real exchange  rate and bank 
lending. 
Moreover,  the hypothesis  that high capital inflows make a financial 
crisis more likely does not fare well in our subsample of eight countries, 
as can be seen from table 7. True, troubled Mexico's  capital inflows in 
1989-94,  measured by the average capital account surplus (including 
errors and omissions)  of 5.6  percent of GDP,  may seem risky,  but this 
pales in comparison to the 9.9 percent and 10. 1 percent surpluses posted 
by Malaysia and Thailand (arguably the Asian economies  least affected 
by the Tequila shock),  respectively,  and the 6.3 percent posted by Chile 
(Latin America's  star performer during this period). In fact, the regional 
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Table  7. Capital Account  as a Share of GDP, Selected  Countries, 1989-94 
Percent 
Country  and item  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Argentina 
Total  -10.4  -4.1  0.1  3.9  2.9  2.8 
Direct investment  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.8  2.5  0.5 
Portfolio investment  3.4  -0.9  0.3  -0.2  7.2  0.6 
Other short-runL  -4.6  1.1  1.1  2.6  -10.6  2.0 
Other"  -10.6  -5.6  -2.5  -0.3  3.8  -0.2 
Net errors and omissions  -0.3  0.5  -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Total  +  errors  -10.7  -3.6  -0.1  4.0  2.9  2.8 
Colombia 
Total  1.0  0.1  -1.9  0.6  4.1  4.8 
Direct investment  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.3  1.8  2.5 
Portfolio investment  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.8 
Other short-runL  0.1  0.2  -0.4  -0.4  3.7  1.6 
Other"  -0.4  -1.0  -2.4  -0.4  -2.1  -0.1 
Net errors and omissions  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.0  0.4  0.1 
Total  +  errors  1.4  0.2  -1.3  0.7  4.5  4.9 
Chile 
Total  4.3  10.0  2.4  6.7  6.1  8.7 
Direct investment  4.5  1.9  1.2  0.8  0.9  1.7 
Portfolio investment  0.3  1.2  0.5  1.1  1.6  2.0 
Other short-runL  3.2  4.1  2.0  0.9  2.3  2.2 
Otherh  -3.7  2.8  -1  .3  4.1  1.2  2.9 
Net errors and omissions  -0.4  -0.5  0.9  0.7  -0.2  -1.1 
Total  +  errors  3.9  9.6  3.3  7.5  5.9  7.6 
Indonesia 
Total  3.1  4.2  4.9  4.8  3.7  2.2 
Direct investment  0.6  1.0  1.3  1.4  1.3  1.2 
Portfolio investment  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  1.1  0.6 
Other short-run!,  0.7  4.4  2.2  1.7  -0.8  0.5 
Otherh  2.0  -1.1  1.5  1.8  2.0  -0.2 
Net errors and omissions  -1.4  0.7  0.1  -1.0  -1.9  -0.2 
Total  +  errors  1.7  4.9  5.0  3.8  1.7  2.0 
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Table 7. (continued) 
Percent 
Country and item  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Malaysia 
Total  3.4  4.1  11.8  15.0  17.0  2.1 
Direct investment  4.4  5.4  8.5  8.9  7.9  6.2 
Portfolio investment  -0.3  -  0.6  0.4  - 1.9  - 1.  -  2.3 
Other short-run"  -0.1  -0.5  2.1  2.7  -1.4  1.0 
Other"  -0.7  -0.3  0.9  5.3  11.5  -2.8 
Net errors and omissions  -0.9  2.5  -0.3  0.1  5.4  -0.7 
Total +  errors  2.4  6.6  11.5  15.1  22.3  1.4 
Mexico 
Total  0.5  3.4  8.7  8.1  9.2  3.4 
Direct investment  1.5  1.1  1.6  1.3  1.2  2.1 
Portfolio investment  0.1  -  1.6  4.2  5.7  7.7  2.0 
Other short-run"  -0.4  -0.4  0.1  1.8  -0.5  -1  .4 
Other"  -0.7  4.4  2.8  -0.8  0.7  0.6 
Net errors and omissions  2.2  0.5  -0.8  -0.3  -0.9  -0.4 
Total +  errors  2.7  3.9  7.9  7.8  8.3  2.9 
Phillipines 
Total  3.2  4.6  6.4  6.1  5.6  7.7 
Direct investment  1.3  1.2  1.2  0.4  1.4  2.9 
Portfolio investment  0.7  -  0.1  0.2  0.1  -0.3  -0.7 
Other short-run!,  0.1  0.9  1.8  -0.3  1.0  0.9 
Other"  1.1  2.7  3.2  5.9  3.5  4.6 
Net errors and omissions  0.9  1.3  -0.3  -1.0  0.5  0.3 
Total  +  errors  4.1  6.0  6.1  5.1  6.1  8.1 
Thailand 
Total  9.1  10.6  11.9  8.8  9.0  9.9 
Direct investment  2.4  2.7  1.9  1.8  1.2  0.1 
Portfolio investment  2.1  0.0  -0.1  0.8  4.4  1.7 
Other short-run!,  2.2  4.6  5.6  3.2  1.1  -1.7 
Other"'  2.5  3.4  4.5  3.0  2.3  9.7 
Net errors and omissions  1.3  1.7  0.4  -0.5  -0.2  -1.1 
Total  +  errors  10.4  12.3  12.3  8.3  8.7  8.8 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Pai  'vinens Slialislic.s  for all countries except the following:  Argentina 
1994: IMF, Ar-geniliinta-Rec  enii  E-ono,no1ic-  DevelopmnenIs  ( 1995); Colombia 1993-94:  Inter-American  Development Bank's 
worldwide web page. 
a.  "Other  short-run'  is constructed by identifying short-term flows within the category 'other investments'" in the IMF's 
standard  presentation of the capital account. 
b. "Other" is constructed as a residual. 176  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
average of capital inflows  for Latin America (3.2  percent) is substan- 
tially below  that of Asia (7.3  percent).  And dividing the countries into 
those strongly influenced by the Tequila effect  (Argentina and the Phil- 
ippines,  in  addition  to  Mexico)  and those  less  so,  we  find that,  on 
average, the latter enjoyed a larger capital account surplus (6.2 percent) 
than the former (3.6  percent). '9 
It Is the Composition  of Capital Inzflows  That Matters 
This  hypothesis  comes  in two  varieties.  The  first emphasizes  that 
short-term flows  (equities,  short-maturity bonds,  and deposits  in local 
banks) can turn around easily,  while  longer-term flows (long-maturity 
bonds and loans,  and especially,  foreign direct investment) cannot. The 
second  focuses  on the effects  of each  kind of  flow: long-term capital 
inflows such as foreign direct investment are good because they increase 
the productive  capacity  of the country and produce the revenues  nec- 
essary to cover future capital outflows (if they occur),  while short-term 
flows may be associated  with consumption booms or inefficient  invest- 
ment projects.20 However,  both  varieties  of  the  hypothesis  have  the 
same flavor: foreign direct investment is desirable; "hot"  (that is, short- 
term) money  is not. 
To  determine  whether this  dichotomy  is  important, we  add to the 
benchmark regression,  one  at a time,  the average ratio of  short-term 
capital inflows (defined as the sum of portfolio investment,  other short- 
term flows,  and errors and omissions)  to GDP from 1990 to  1994,  and 
the percentage change in this variable between  1990 and 1994.  As can 
be  seen  from table  5,  the average  ratio of  short-term capital  inflows 
does seem to matter (with marginal statistical significance)  for the pre- 
diction  of  financial  crises  in  countries  with  low  reserves  and  weak 
fundamentals (the hypothesis that 18  +  19 +  1310 =  0 is rejected with 
a p value of 0.09).  However,  as can be seen in table 6, the percentage 
19.  Our results on the composition  of capital inflows  are related to those of Claes- 
sens,  Dooley,  and Warner (1995). 
20.  The link with inefficient  investment projects can be rationalized in the following 
way.  If domestic  banks are borrowing abroad and lending this money at home,  they will 
be unwilling  to finance  long-term  investment  projects with short-term borrowing,  pre- 
ferring to direct the resources  to more liquid credit card or consumption  loans.  And if, 
in fact,  these  resources  end  up in the hands of  a domestic  real investor,  the  investor 
must be  willing  to finance  a project  with  short loans-a  high  risk strategy that could 
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change  in short-term capital inflows  does  not enter significantly.  Fur- 
thermore,  when  fundamentals  are strong,  neither the average nor the 
percentage change cnter significantly. 
In the  subsample  of  eight  countries,  the evidence  that short-term 
capital inflows  matter is weaker.  As can be inferred from table 7,  the 
"gang  of three"  troubled countries (Argentina,  Mexico,  and the Phil- 
ippines)  received,  on average,  a smaller share of GDP in the form of 
short-term inflows  (1.4  percent) than did the relatively  untroubled na- 
tions  (2.2  percent).  Within  Latin America,  unscathed  Chile  actually 
absorbed more hot money  (3.5  percent of GDP),  on average,  than did 
collapsing  Mexico  (2.9 percent). These are averages over 1989-94,  and 
it  could  be  argued  that  with  short-term  flows  only  the  last  year  is 
significant.  But this consideration  scarcely changes the conclusions.  If 
one  considers  1993  (1994  is  already  tainted  by  the  shock  in  some 
countries),  the average of short-term inflows for the countries that later 
came  under  attack  (Argentina,  Mexico,  and the  Philippines)  is  1.4 
percent of GDP,  while  for the other countries it is 3.0  percent. 
Large Current Account Deficits  during the Period  of Inflows Make 
a Financial  Crisis More Likely 
In the case of Mexico,  the large and growing current account deficit 
has often  been  singled  out as a key  determinant of  the crisis.2'  This 
story has two  strands. In one,  large deficits  lead to high external debt 
until the country either becomes  insolvent  (the present value  of  con- 
ceivable  trade balance surpluses does not suffice to cover external ob- 
ligations)  or faces  a borrowing constraint (lenders understand that the 
country will have no incentive  to repay any additional debt).22 In either 
case,  lending ceases,  and the country finds itself in a crisis.  The second 
strand stresses  that even  when insolvency  or credit limits  are not ini- 
tially at issue,  large external deficits expose  a country to the fickleness 
of  capital  markets.  If  investors  suddenly  decide  to  stop financing  its 
deficits,  the country must undergo a sudden and painful adjustment. If, 
in addition,  this adjustment creates severe economic  disruption (labor 
21.  Dornbusch  and  Werner  (1994)  stressed  this  point  even  before  the  collapse; 
Dornbusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes  (1995)  have stressed it since. 
22.  Atkeson  and Rios-Rull  (1996)  emphasize  the role of  borrowing  constraints  in 
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unrest,  the need to  levy  highly  distortionary taxes,  and so  forth),  ex 
post,  the country may have difficulty  paying,  thus validating the pes- 
simistic expectations  of investors.  In this case there would be multiple 
equilibria. 23 
The recent experience  of Mexico  has stimulated such concerns,  but 
can one generalize  the link between  large current account deficits  and 
vulnerability  to  financial crises  in other emerging  markets? Malaysia 
and the Philippines  are instructive examples.  As can be seen from table 
8,  those  countries'  current accounts  were large and variable over the 
last decade.  During  1989-94,  Malaysia's  average deficit was reasona- 
bly high: 4 percent of GDP,  as compared to Mexico's  5.4  percent.  It 
was also extremely  variable,  increasing from 2 percent of GDP in 1990 
to  almost  9  percent  in  1991,  falling  for  a couple  of  years,  and then 
rising to almost 6 percent in 1994. Malaysia is not unique among Asian 
countries  in this  regard.  Over  1989-94,  the average  current account 
deficit  for an Asian  country in the smaller sample was 4.1  percent of 
GDP; the corresponding  figure for a Latin American country was  2.1 
percent.  Over the same period,  the average external deficit for Argen- 
tina,  Mexico,  and the Philippines  was  3.5  percent of GDP,  while  for 
the five countries that were not hit by crisis it was 2.9  percent-which 
is not enough of a difference to account for the variation in depth among 
the financial crises  that occurred in early  1995. 
Regressions  for the larger sample of emerging markets tell a similar 
story.  In tables  5  and 6  we  include  in the benchmark regression  the 
average ratio of the current account to GDP from 1990 to  1994 and the 
percentage  change  in this ratio over the same period,  alone and inter- 
acted  with  the  low  reserves  dummy  and the  low  reserves  and weak 
fundamentals dummy (we  again denote the corresponding coefficients 
by  38, 19,  and  I  10, respectively).  Again in this case,  we cannot reject 
the null hypotheses  that 18  +  19  =  0 and 18  +  19  +  310 =  0.  The 
same is true for the percentage change in the ratio of the current account 
to GDP for the period  1990-94. 
Even  if change  in the current account does  not seem  to matter, do 
its components  have an independent effect?24 A plausible  view  is that 
23.  See Calvo  (1995)  for such an explanation of the Mexican case. 
24.  As  Feldstein  and Horioka  (1980)  point  out,  saving  and investment  are highly 
correlated in the medium run, even  in environments  in which  one might expect  a high 
degree  of  capital  mobility  (for  example,  industrialized  countries).  This  point  is  even Jeffrey  D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco  179 
Table 8.  Current  Account  as a Share of GDP, Selected  Countries,  1989-94 
Percent 
Country 
and item  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Argentina 
Current account  -  1.7  3.2  -0.3  -  2.9  -  2.9  -  2.8 
Investment  15.5  14.0  14.6  16.7  18.2  19.9 
Saving  13.8  17.2  14.3  13.8  15.3  17.1 
Chile 
Current account  -2.5  -  1.8  0.3  -  1.7  -4.6  -  1.5 
Investment  25.5  26.3  24.5  26.8  28.8  26.8 
Saving  23.0  24.5  24.8  25.1  24.2  25.3 
Mexico 
Current account  -  2.8  -  3.0  -  5.1  -  7.3  -  6.4  -  7.6 
Investment  22.2  22.8  23.4  24.4  23.2  23.5 
Saving  19.4  19.8  18.3  17.1  16.8  15.8 
Colombia 
Current account  -0.5  1.3  5.7  2.1  -4.2  -4.8 
Investment  20.0  18.5  16.0  17.2  19.9  19.8 
Saving  19.5  19.9  21.6  19.3  15.7  15.0 
Philippines 
Current account  -3.4  -6.1  -2.3  -  1.9  -6.0  -4.3 
Investment  21.6  24.2  20.2  21.3  24.0  24.0 
Saving  18.2  18.1  17.9  19.5  17.9  19.7 
Thailand 
Curent account  -  3.5  -  8.5  -  7.7  -  5.7  -  5.6  -  5.9 
Investment  35.1  41.1  42.2  39.6  39.9  40.1 
Saving  31.6  32.6  34.5  33.9  34.3  34.3 
Malaysia 
Current account  0.8  -  2.0  -  8.9  -  3.7  -  4.4  -  5.9 
Investment  28.6  31.3  35.9  33.5  35.0  38.5 
Saving  29.4  29.3  27.0  29.7  30.6  32.6 
Indonesia 
Current account  -  1.2  -2.8  -3.7  -2.2  -  1.3  -  1.6 
Investment  35.2  36.1  35.5  35.9  33.2  34.0 
Saving  34.0  33.3  31.8  33.7  31.9  32.4 
Source: International  Monetary Fund, Iniiernialiotnail  Finan11c1ial  Sitilislics tor all countries except the following: Argentina 
1994: IMF, Argeniinita-Rec  enl1  E o,wo,nic  Dev'elopmnens  ( 1995): Colombia  1994: IMF, Colombhia-Receni Econom,ic  De- 
veloptenes  ( 1995); the Philippines 1994: IMF, Phili;;ines-Recenl  Economic Develo;lmens  ( 1995). 180  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
a current account deficit caused by an increase in investment  is of less 
concern  (because  productive  capacity  and hence  the  ability  to  repay 
debt are increasing)  than one caused by a fall in saving.  This view does 
not receive  support from our regression analysis.  As presented in tables 
5 and 6,  the average and percentage changes in the ratios of saving to 
GDP and investment  to GDP for the period  1990-94  do not seem  to 
explain why some countries suffered a financial crisis in 1995 and others 
did not. 
Loose  Fiscal  Policy  Lies behind Financial  Crisis 
Imprudent fiscal  policy  has  often  been  singled  out  as  a cause  of 
financial and currency crisis in emerging markets, particularly in Latin 
America.  A country's  fiscal stance may matter directly; for instance,  a 
large public  sector borrowing requirement over time may lead to bal- 
looning  public debt and investor discomfort.  Perhaps more important, 
a fiscal  deficit  may underlie  many of  the often  mentioned  culprits of 
financial crisis,  such as current account deficit,  real appreciation,  and 
high  monetary growth.  Any  effect  that these factors  seem  to have on 
the likelihood  of crisis  may actually be the result of fiscal policy. 
As important as a country's fiscal stance may be in theory, however, 
it is important to notice that irresponsible fiscal behavior was not among 
the central causes  of  the recent troubles.  In the case  of  Mexico,  the 
government ran budget surpluses in 1992 and 1993, and a deficit of less 
than  1 percent  of  GDP  in  1994;  the country's  public  debt,  at about 
40 percent of GDP,  was less  than 60 percent of the OECD average.25 
The same is true of Argentina (where in  1992-94  the deficit averaged 
0.5  percent of output) and to a lesser extent of the Philippines (with an 
average deficit of  1.6 percent of GDP in the same period).26 Neverthe- 
less,  fiscal  performance  was  better,  on average,  in the countries  that 
escaped crisis.  For the period 1989-94  as a whole,  the countries without 
more relevant in the case of emerging markets,  which are imperfectly  integrated  into 
world financial  markets. 
25.  See Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a) for details and discussion. 
26.  Such numbers  have to be interpreted  with caution. Talvi (1996) stresses  that in 
the context of a consumption  boom, any measure  of the deficit that is not cyclically 
adjusted  can be extremely  misleading.  This point  seems to have some validity  for Mexico 
and Argentina,  where the recessions  of 1993 caused incipient  (and  ultimately,  substan- 
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crises  show  an average  surplus of 0.6  percent of GDP,  as opposed  to 
the average deficit of  1.7 percent of GDP for Argentina,  Mexico,  and 
the Philippines.  OnCe again,  though,  while  these  differences  are not 
trivial,  they are not large enough to account for the huge disparities in 
observed outcomes. 
To check for the influence of fiscal policy  more generally,  in tables 
5  and 6  we  include  as predictors  in our regressions  the average  and 
percent  change  over  the  period  1990-94  in the  ratio of  government 
consumption  to GDP.  Only the percentage change in government con- 
sumption does  seem to matter in the prediction of financial crisis,  but 
once again, only in countries with low reserves and weak fundamentals 
(the hypothesis  that 18  +  39  +  310 =  0 is rejected with ap  value of 
0.03).  Government consumption does not enter significantly in the other 
cases.  We  do not perform a regression  with the fiscal  deficit  because 
we lack comparable cross-country  data for 1993 and 1994. 
The Crucial Real Exchange Rate 
As the results presented above show,  a big share of the cross-country 
variation in the crisis  index  is explained  by variations in the real ex- 
change  rate and in the patterns of  bank lending  in the  1990s,  and by 
the ratio of reserves to monetary assets. It is natural to ask what accounts 
for  the  changes  in  these  variables.  In this  section  we  focus  on  the 
behavior of the real exchange  rate in our subsample of eight countries. 
The following  section deals with the genesis  of the bank lending booms. 
The conventional  wisdom  is that capital inflows  and outflows  (and 
terms-of-trade  shocks)  explain  much of the short-run variation in the 
real exchange  rate. The standard story is that capital inflows  stimulate 
overall  absorption,  so that the demand for both traded and nontraded 
goods  must rise.  If the economy  is open,  it faces  a very elastic  supply 
of tradeables at world prices.  The supply of nontradeables, on the other 
hand, is much less  elastic,  reflecting the fact that resources have to be 
redeployed  to the home  goods  sector if  its output is to increase.  The 
capital inflow,  therefore,  naturally increases the relative price of non- 
traded goods. 
But this conventional  wisdom  does  not fit well  with the data.  The 
most  striking fact  about the large  sample  of  emerging  markets-and -  I  .  t  ON 
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about our subsample  of  eight  cases,  in particular-is  the lack of cor- 
relation  between  the  size  of  capital  inflows  and real  exchange  rate 
behavior.  In table 9 we classify  countries according to the size of their 
real appreciation. The countries with the largest real appreciation (Ar- 
gentina  and Mexico)  experienced  an average  capital  account  surplus 
(that is,  capital  inflow)  of  3.6  percent of  GDP over  1990-94;  for the 
countries in the middle group (Chile and the Philippines),  the average 
surplus was 6.5  percent; and it was 6.7  percent for the countries  with 
the least appreciation (Colombia,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and Thailand). 
There are three other generic  explanations  for the variation in the 
real exchange  rate. First, similar capital inflows might lead to different 
changes  in absorption (and therefore to differences  in the demand for 
nontradeables) across countries. Second,  although the resulting changes 
in absorption might be similar,  structural differences  across countries 
might make the associated  price responses  differ.  Third,  in the short 
run, nominal exchange rate policy  may limit the extent of appreciation, 
even  if  fundamentals  have  changed.  We  consider  each  explanation 
in turn. 
Similar Capital Inflows Lead to Different  Changes in Absorption 
One possibility  is that capital comes  in, but the inflow does not lead 
to  additional  demand  for goods  and services.  This  could  happen for 
several  reasons.  We  focus  on two: the sterilization  of  inflows  and an 
offsetting  fiscal contraction. 
In theory at least,  a country with an active central bank could simply 
buy up the inflow,  leaving demand unchanged. The balance of payments 
identity is helpful to see this point: CA +  AR =  KA, where CA is the 
current account,  KA is the capital account,  and AR is the change in the 
level  of reserves.  If the whole  of the capital account surplus goes  into 
reserve accumulation  (AR  =  KA), the current account need not regis- 
ter a deficit.  In practice,  however,  a sterilization  of this magnitude- 
several percentage points of GDP per year-is  not easily accomplished, 
since the associated  costs can be quite high,  in the form of central bank 
losses  or the disintermediation  of the banking system.27 
27.  Traditional  open market  operations  (that is, the sale of bonds by the central 
bank) affect the central bank's balance sheet (higher foreign exchange reserves are 
matched  by higher domestic bond liabilities), but ensure that the money base is un- 184  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
All  the countries  in the crisis  group  (Argentina,  Mexico,  and the 
Philippines),  except  for  Argentina,  engaged  in  sterilization  of  some 
sort, but with differing intensities  and degrees of success.  All the Asian 
countries  engaged  in substantial  open  market operations,  and all  but 
Indonesia  used  reserve  requirements  in a countercyclical  manner. In 
addition,  Malaysia  and Indonesia-along  with Singapore  and Taiwan 
(not in our crisis group)-moved  around government deposits and pen- 
sion fund assets to lower deposits  held by commercial banks. In Latin 
America,  Chile and Colombia came close to the Asian modus operandi, 
implementing  active  sterilization  on all fronts-in  particular, early in 
the inflow period. Mexico  is a peculiar case because it generously issued 
cetes  and tesobonos  as  part of  its  open  market operations,  but then 
moved  in the other direction by setting required bank reserves against 
peso  deposits  to zero.  To summarize the evidence,  differences  in ster- 
ilization  do  not  seem  to  account  for the large differences  in real ex- 
change rate outcomes. 
Alternatively,  domestic  absorption might fail to rise in response  to 
capital  inflows  because  of  countercyclical  fiscal  policy.  Clearly,  if  a 
cut in the government  deficit is of similar magnitude to an increase in 
private spending,  aggregate demand will  be largely unchanged.  More 
important for  our purposes,  since  government  expenditure  generally 
falls  largely  on  nontraded  goods,  a  cut  in  government  spending  in 
response to an increase in capital inflows will directly diminish excess 
demand in the nontraded sector,  thus helping  to limit increases  in the 
real exchange  rate.28 The behavior of government consumption  in our 
changed  after  a capital  inflow.  However,  open  market operations  are fiscally  costly 
because the bonds used to sterilize the money supply typically carry much higher interest 
rates than the  central  bank could  earn by  depositing  the additional  foreign  exchange 
reserves  abroad.  A  less  direct kind of  sterilization  relies  on changes  in required bank 
reserves  (and  therefore  in  the  monetary  multiplier)  to  ensure  that the  money  supply 
remains unchanged,  even  if the monetary base has risen.  But here the problem is that 
high reserve requirements encourange disintermediation,  and may cause financial activ- 
ity to curb markets over which  the central bank has no control.  Additionally,  countries 
can attempt to prevent inflows from being intermediated by the domestic banking system 
(and thereby  lent again)  by requiring borrowers-in  particular, public  enterprises-to 
deposit  loan proceeds  with the central bank, rather than with commercial  banks. 
The literature on the mechanics  and effects  of sterilization  has grown tremendously 
in the last couple  of years.  A few  of the useful contributions are Calvo  (1991),  Reisen 
(1993),  Frankel (1994),  and Spiegel  (1995). 
28.  Corbo and Hernandez (1994)  stress this point. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andre's  Velasco  185 
sample does  provide  evidence  that the countries that contracted fiscal 
expenditures experienced  less appreciation. As table 9 shows,  Mexico, 
in the group with the highest  appreciation,  expanded government con- 
sumption by an average of  0.8  percentage  point of GDP between  the 
period  1986-89  and the period  1990-94.29  For countries in the middle 
group, government consumption was approximately constant (as a share 
of GDP)  between  these  two  periods,  while  for the countries  with the 
least appreciation,  it fell  by 3.9  percentage points of GDP. 
Differences  in Structure 
Another reason why  Asia  and Latin America  might differ with re- 
spect to real exchange  rate movements  is the differences  in the under- 
lying  productive  structures of  their economies.  An argument in favor 
of this explanation might go as follows.  In Latin America the tradeables 
sector is very resource intensive,  while the nontradeables sector is more 
labor intensive.  Therefore a change in the relative prices of nontrade- 
ables and tradeables would be required to induce a movement of labor 
between  the  two  sectors.  When  demand for nontradeables  rises  (for 
example,  because  of a capital inflow),  an increase in the relative price 
of nontradeables accompanies the flow of labor from tradeables to non- 
tradeables.  In East Asia,  by contrast,  where tradeables manufactures 
are largely  labor intensive,  a flow of labor between  nontradeables and 
tradeables can occur without sizeable  movements  in the price of non- 
tradeables relative to tradeables. In graphic terms, the production pos- 
sibility  frontier between  tradeables and nontradeables is nearly linear 
for Asian countries,  while  for Latin American countries,  it is strongly 
bowed outward. If this view  is correct, the real exchange  rate in Latin 
American  countries  would  be  highly  sensitive  to  shifts  in  domestic 
absorption caused  by  changes  in capital  inflows.  In Asian  countries, 
the real exchange  rate would hardly vary with capital inflows. 
One implication  of this hypothesis  is that, after controlling for other 
more conventional  sources of variability,  the real exchange rate should 
be less  volatile  in countries with large,  labor-intensive  tradeables sec- 
tors.  To  see  whether there is evidence  to support this hypothesis,  we 
estimate regressions  using the same sample of countries as in the pre- 
29.  No  information  is  available  on  the  behavior  of  government  consumption  in 
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Table 10. Explaining  the Real Exchange  Rate Variancea 
Constant  752.34  727.16 
(319.68)  (254.96) 
Terms of trade variance  0.24  0.26 
(0.17)  (0.15) 
Government consumption variance  -27,621.4 
(82,228.2) 
Proxy for manufactured exports/GDP"  -  1,981.98  -  1,915.16 
(1,195.78)  (1,029.23) 
Slu,nnary statistic 
R_2  0.19  0.19 
R2  0.04  0.10 
Acddenidwl/n: 
Inistrumenztcil  regressioni predicting 
inanqftwctured  exI)orts!GDP 
Constant  0.03 
(0.01) 
Sachs-Warner openness index  0.15 
(0.07) 
Population density  0.00 
(0.00) 
Slu mnnariy  stcatistic 
R2  0.64 
R2  0.60 
Source: World Bank.  "STARS':  Sachs and Warner  (1995). 
a. The dependent variable is the real exchange rate variance. The regression technique is two-stage least squares with a 
heteroskedasticitv-consistent covariance matrix for the full sample of twenty countries over 1980-92.  Standard  errors are 
shown in parentheses. 
b. Using Sachs-Warner ( 1995) openness index and population density as instruments. 
vious regressions.  The results of these regressions are presented in table 
10. The variance of the real exchange  rate in  1980-92  is postulated to 
depend on the variance  of the terms of trade and of  government  con- 
sumption  during  the  same  period,  and on  the ratio of  manufactured 
exports to GDP in 1980-92.  Since the latter is an endogenous  variable, 
we instrument it by using population density (number of inhabitants per 
square  mile)  and  the  Sachs-Warner  index  of  the  openness  of  trade 
policy.3'  The instruments work reasonably well,  as table 10 shows.  The 
results of the second regression are mixed.  Somewhat surprisingly, the 
variance  of  the  terms of  trade is  not  significant  (it  has  a p  value  of 
30.  Sachs and Warner (1995). Jeffrey D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andre's  Velasco  187 
0.18).  The  variance  of  government  consumption  has the wrong  sign 
and  is  insignificant.  Most  important for  our purposes,  the  share  of 
manufactured  exports  in  GDP  has  the  expected  sign  (a  higher  ratio 
means less  variability for the real exchange  rate), but has a p value of 
0. 12.  When  we  run the  same  regression  eliminating  the variance  of 
government consumption as a regressor (given the poor performance of 
the fiscal variable),  the p value  falls  to 0.08.  Thus there is weak evi- 
dence to suggest that the larger a country's tradeables sector, the lower 
the variability  in its real exchange  rate resulting  from fluctuations  in 
world interest rates and domestic  demand. 
Nominal Exchange  Rate Policy 
The  explanations  discussed  so  far have  focused  on  the  degree  to 
which the equilibrium real exchange rate changes in response to capital 
inflows  and other fundamentals.  An alternative line of explanation fo- 
cuses  not on the underlying fundamentals,  but on the degree to which 
nominal exchange  rate policy  can prevent the real exchange  rate from 
appreciating,  even  if the underlying equilibrium relative price of non- 
traded goods  has changed.  This is what the policy  of  "real  exchange 
rate targeting"  seeks to achieve."3 
Most economists  would agree that if the capital inflow,  and therefore 
the change  in the "fundamental"  real exchange  rate, are more or less 
permanent, real exchange rate targeting cannot succeed in the long run: 
repeated nominal  devaluations  will  simply  elicit  repeated increases  in 
prices  and  will  fail  to  affect  the  real  exchange  rate.  But  as  usual, 
definitions  of the long run vary widely.  If there is enough price sticki- 
ness over plausibly  short periods,  and if capital inflows are also short- 
lived,  so that a brief period is all that is at stake, then nominal exchange 
rate policy  may well  have some ability to prevent real appreciation.32 
31.  Those  who advocate  such policy  would probably prefer to say that since capital 
inflows  are typically  transitory,  they  do  not change  the  long-run equilibrium  real ex- 
change rate. Hence real exchange  rate targeting simply attempts to keep the current real 
exchange  rate from deviating  too far from its "'long-run level." 
32.  Calvo,  Reinhart, and Vegh  (1995)  make a different point concerning  the poten- 
tial virtues of  targeting: even  if  it is  inflationary,  it may improve welfare.  Consider  a 
standard maximizing  model  in  which  domestic  money  is  held  because  of  a cash-in- 
advance constraint.  Suppose that the foreign nominal (but not the real) interest rate falls 
temporarily.  If  domestic  policy  is  static,  consumption  and  the  current account  will 
undergo a welfare-reducing  fluctuation.  If,  by contrast,  the rate of  nominal  exchange 188  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
The evidence  from our subsample of eight countries is instructive as 
to the effects  of real exchange  rate targeting. Indonesia, Colombia,  and 
Chile  have  explicitly  attempted to  target the real exchange  rate.  An 
important aspect  of  policy  in these  three countries  was not simply  to 
attempt to target some arbitrary and constant real exchange  rate, inde- 
pendent  of  circumstances.  Both  Colombia  and Chile  explicitly  cited 
changing fundamentals (oil in Colombia,  higher flows of foreign direct 
investment  in Chile)  as reasons for allowing  nominal and real appreci- 
ation  at several  junctures  over  the  five-year  period.  Note,  also,  that 
these  attempts at targeting  were  not without cost:  in the  1990s  Chile 
and Colombia experienced  slower convergence to international inflation 
rates than did Mexico  and, especially,  Argentina,  in spite of their vir- 
tuous fiscal policies.  The same is true of Indonesia in comparison with 
Thailand  and Malaysia.  To  summarize,  an accommodating  nominal 
exchange  rate policy  may be  able to limit  real appreciation over  the 
short to medium run, although probably at some expense,  in terms of 
inflation. 
Lending Booms, Banking Crises, and Currency Crises 
Our empirical work suggests that the countries that experienced lend- 
ing  booms  were  more  likely  to  suffer  currency crises  as  a result  of 
the Tequila  effect.  In this  section  we  examine  why this might be so, 
and ask why  some  countries  experienced  lending booms  while  others 
did not. 
The observation that banking and currency difficulties often go hand 
in hand is hardly new: the link has been evident in crises ranging from 
the United  States in the  1930s to Chile in the early  1980s.33 Theoreti- 
rate depreciation  is temporarily  increased  to offset the foreign shock, domestic con- 
sumption  will be flat, the current  account will remain  balanced, and welfare will not 
fall.  l 
33.  Wigmore (1987) argues that the failure of the Federal  Reserve to protect the 
U.S. banking  system in the winter  of 1932-33 was the result  of its fear that providing 
lender-of-last-resort  credit  to the banks  would undermine  the U.S. dollar's link to gold. 
In Chile in 1982, high interest  rates  under  a fixed exchange  rate  helped to precipitate  a 
banking  collapse. The associated  expansion  of domestic  credit  contributed  to the demise 
of the exchange rate  peg; see Velasco (1991) for details. Jeffrey  D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco  189 
cally,  the  link between  these  "twin  crises"  is  not hard to ascertain. 
Abrupt changes  in  the  demand  for  money  (caused,  for  instance,  by 
expectations  of  a devaluation  and an incipient  speculative  attack) can 
cause  a  sharp fall  in  bank  deposits.  But  under a  fractional  reserve 
system,  banks do not have sufficient cash in hand to cover their liabil- 
ities: in the absence of an injection of liquidity from the outside  (typi- 
cally  from the central bank),  it is very likely  that payments will  cease 
and a bank panic will  occur.  Even  if the banks could wait until loans 
matured in order to satisfy depositors' demands (which would take time, 
given their essential  role as maturity transformers), the ensuing adjust- 
ment would be neither easy  nor painless.  The resulting credit squeeze 
on  borrower  firms would  send  interest  rates  sky  high.  In emerging 
markets, banks are the main source of corporate credit, and most firms 
cannot turn around and borrow from the world market, no matter how 
deregulated the capital account may be.  The need to avoid  a wave  of 
bankruptcies  and  serious  economic  disruption  serves  as  yet  another 
reason for the government to step in. 
One implication  of this situation is that the monetary base is not the 
only claim on the central bank that can be called in when times are bad. 
In fact, since bank liabilities  are covered by implicit or explicit govern- 
ment guarantees,  all M2  is potentially  a liability  of the central bank. 
Therefore the expansion  of liquidity generated by a bank run can feed 
a speculative  attack on the reserves of the central bank. 
Bank portfolios  can be weakened suddenly by an exogenous  shock. 
But bad luck is not the only culprit of bank weakness.  More often than 
not,  portfolios  are weakened  endogenously  by  swift  expansions  of 
credit: boom  leads to bust.  As Michael  Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann 
persuasively  argue,  the empirical  link between  lending  booms  and fi- 
nancial crises is very strong.34 Rapid growth in the ratio of bank credit 
to GDP preceded financial troubles in Argentina (1981),  Chile (1981- 
82),  Colombia  (1982-83),  Uruguay (1982),  Norway  (1987),  Finland 
(1991-92),  Japan (1992-93),  and Sweden  (1991).  Among  the  eight 
countries in our subsample, there was substantial lending growth during 
the period 1990-94  in Argentina,  Mexico,  and the Phillippines,  which 
were the countries that experienced  the greatest increases in their crisis 
34.  Gavin  and Hausmann  (1995). 190  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
indexes during 1995. By contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia,  which were 
much less  severely  affected  by the Tequila  shock,  did not experience 
prior lending booms. 
With regard to lending  booms,  it is extremely  important to distin- 
guish levels  of lending from rates of increase.  All the Asian countries, 
except the Philippines,  show very high ratios of private sector credit to 
output.  This  indicates  nothing but financial deepening  and, in and of 
itself,  is no cause  for concern.  On the other hand,  sharp increases  in 
lending to the private sector within a short period of time are worrying. 
Such jumps are likely  to lower average loan quality. 
Why  were  there  lending  booms  in  some  of  the  countries  in  our 
sample? A commonly  cited culprit is swift liberalization of the capital 
account,  followed  by a surge in inflows  that, presumably,  was  inter- 
mediated  by  the  banking  sector.  There  are two  problems  with  this 
explanation.  First,  while  there have  been  incremental  moves  toward 
liberalization  in all of the countries in the sample,  in almost all cases 
the capital account has been quite open for a long time.  For instance, 
Indonesia liberalized  its capital account in the 1970s,  well  ahead of its 
current account; Mexico,  except  for a brief period of  controls  during 
the  1982 crisis,  has always  remained open to capital movements.  The 
two  partial exceptions  are Colombia  and Chile,  and even  they  have 
reasonably open capital accounts by any measure.35 Thus it is difficult 
to draw a clear link between  an extreme policy  change on the external 
front and a subsequent lending boom. 
The second  problem is that there is no obvious  correlation between 
the size of the capital inflow and the subsequent behavior of bank credit. 
Such  a correlation  only  seems  to exist  in the case  of  Mexico,  where 
both capital inflows and bank lending grew tremendously. Malaysia and 
Chile,  and to a lesser extent Colombia,  experienced  very large capital 
account surpluses that had no obvious  effect  on bank behavior.36 
35.  In both  these  countries  the main  restrictions  are taxes  on  short-term  inflows, 
which were instituted in the early  1990s.  Chile also requires that portfolio  flows remain 
in the country for at least one year. 
36.  Calvo,  Leiderman,  and Reinhart (1994)  offer  the intriguing conjecture  that the 
composition  of capital flows  is important in this regard: foreign direct investment typi- 
cally  is not intermediated by the banking system,  while other flows are. To some extent, 
this may explain  the bank behavior  in Malaysia  (where there had been a massive  boom 
in foreign direct investment)  and in Chile (which was among the countries that received 
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But if the liberalization of the capital account does not seem to have 
played  a role in causing  lending booms,  domestic  financial liberaliza- 
tion does appear to have been influential.  Financial liberalization  typi- 
cally  is accompanied  by aggressive  behavior on the part of banks.  In 
order to raise deposits,  banks increase interest rates and fund more risky 
projects. Given the existence  of deposit insurance (implicit or explicit), 
depositors  find it profitable to move to these banks. Although the pur- 
pose  of  prudential regulation  is  to  impede  this  tendency,  during the 
early years of liberalization  the capacity for oversight  is usually poor. 
Consequently,  when  significant  capital inflows  take place in the early 
stages of financial liberalization,  the lending boom that follows  is likely 
to be associated  with an increase  in the riskiness  and vulnerability  of 
bank portfolios.  Moreover,  since lending expands rapidly, it is difficult 
to determine the ability  to pay of borrowers who can repay old debts 
with easy credit. The weaknesses  of the banking system do not surface 
until capital inflows  reverse. 
During  the  late  1970s  and the  1980s,  the  progression  from  bank 
privatization  and deregulation  to  lending  boom  to eventual  bust was 
observed in a number of countries. In Latin America, Argentina, Chile, 
and Colombia went through this cycle.37 In Asia,  the same was true for 
Indonesia and Malaysia.38 In Indonesia,  for example,  the cycle became 
evident  in  1989-90,  when  financial  liberalization  was  followed  by  a 
lending  boom.  In  Mexico  the  privatization  and deregulation  of  the 
banking system  in the early  1990s had a similar effect. 
The  type  of  deregulation  that a country implemented  also  made a 
difference.  For instance,  Colombia  launched a wide-ranging  program 
to  modernize  its  financial  system  in  1990.19 Barriers to  entry  were 
relaxed,  reserve requirements were rationalized,  and most (but not all) 
interest  rates  were  freed.  But  at the  same  time,  supervision  was 
strengthened,  and all banks were forced to comply  with the capitaliza- 
tion standards of the Basel Accord. A country's policy  stance was often 
determined by previous  experience.  In the early  1980s both Chile and 
Colombia experienced  credit booms and financial crises that led to bank 
interventions,  liquidations,  and bailouts-at  a substantial cost to tax- 
37.  See Balifo  and Sundarajan (1991)  for studies from a set of countries that includes 
Argentina,  Chile,  Uruguay,  and the Philippines. 
38.  See Folkerts-Landau and others (1995). 
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payers. The lesson  of these episodes  was deeply ingrained in the minds 
of policymakers,  and in subsequent years both governments  made the 
enhancement of bank supervision  a priority. Bank problems following 
liberalization  in  Indonesia  and Malaysia  in the  late  1970s  and early 
1980s  also  caused  these  countries  to  pay  greater attention  to  bank 
oversight.  The  strong  performance  of  all  four countries  in  1995  re- 
warded this policy  emphasis. 
During  the  period  1989-94,  attitudes toward bank regulation  and 
oversight  varied widely  across countries.  There was no dichotomy  be- 
tween laissez  faire and thorough going interventionism-no  country in 
our  subsample  subscribed  to  the  latter in  this  period.  Rather,  some 
countries-Malaysia,  Thailand,  and to a lesser  extent  Indonesia,  the 
Philippines,  Colombia,  and Chile-intervened  at the margins to dis- 
courage those bank activities  that were viewed  as potentially too risky, 
and some did not. The Asian countries,  in particular, instituted specific 
limits on commercial  bank borrowing abroad and ceilings  on domestic 
relending  in areas such  as consumer  and real estate  credits.4" All  of 
these countries, to varying degrees, resorted to sterilization and changes 
in reserve requirements in an effort to limit credit growth. Sterilization 
seems  to have been particularly important in Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and 
Thailand.  In these  countries,  periods  of  aggressive  sterilization  coin- 
cided  with  low  growth  in  bank assets,  and periods  of  relaxation  of 
sterilization  coincided  with rapid expansion.4" 
A  third possible  cause  of  a lending  boom  is  a recent  stabilization 
episode.  Deposits  are highly correlated with money demand, and there- 
fore,  with expected  inflation. When a policy  turnaround puts an end to 
hyperinflation,  deposits  swell,  and so do bank loans. This effect,  which 
is nothing but a beneficial payoff (greater financial intermediation) from 
40.  In  Malaysia,  measures  to  limit  the  credit-creating  capacities  of  banks  were 
instituted in 1993; in particular, restrictions on consumption credits,  such as credit cards 
and credit for the purchase of motor vehicles.  In Indonesia,  the prudential regulation of 
commercial  banks was tightened  in  1991; in particular, by raising the required capital- 
to-assets  ratio. Measures to discourage external borrowing, such as limits on commercial 
banks'  foreign  currency  exposure  and external  loans,  were  also  instituted.  Thailand, 
too,  created disincentives  to foreign  borrowing:  in  1990 a  10 percent withholding  tax 
on interest paid on foreign  loans was reinstated (having been suspended for two years). 
In addition,  the Thai authorities set limits on the relending capacities  of banks,  partic- 
ularly on loans for "nonproductive"  activities,  such as consumer and luxury real estate 
loans. 
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stabilization,  probably explains  some  of the sharp increase in lending 
that occurred in Argentina,  for example.  It does not, however,  explain 
the experience  of Mexico,  where stabilization occurred in 1988-89  but 
there was no increase in credit until  1991-94. 
Conclusions 
Are  currency  and financial  crises  the  inevitable  punishment  for  a 
country's  misdeeds?  Or are they  simply  prompted by  contagion  and 
animal spirits, striking guilty and innocent countries alike? In this paper 
we examine these questions by analyzing how twenty emerging markets 
fared  in  the  face  of  the  Tequila  effect  and its  aftermath.  Our main 
conclusion  is that some degree of previous misbehavior was a necessary 
condition for crisis.  This misbehavior took the form of overvalued real 
exchange  rates and recent lending booms,  coupled  with low  reserves, 
relative to the short-term commitments  of the central bank. In the ab- 
sence of these fundamental weaknesses,  contagion was at worst short- 
lived,  and the Tequila effect  left no hangover.  At the same time,  how- 
ever,  an  important element  of  self-fulfilling  panic,  or contagion,  is 
evident  in the aftermath of the Mexican  crisis.  Crises that could have 
occurred,  did not, before the Mexican  episode. 
We also  find that some common explanations  for the occurrence of 
financial  crises  are not  supported by the data from our sample.  The 
behavior  of  current accounts,  the  size  of  capital  inflows,  and fiscal 
policy  stances during the period 1990-94,  in and of themselves,  do not 
explain  why  some  countries  experienced  greater financial crises  than 
others in the aftermath of the December  1994 devaluation. Any explan- 
atory power that these  variables do have is through their effect  on the 
real exchange  rate and credit to the private sector.  For instance,  the 
average current account deficit of hard-hit Argentina was  1.  1 percent, 
while  the deficit  of  Malaysia  (which  did not experience  a crisis)  was 
5.0 percent. Similarly,  Argentina experienced capital inflows averaging 
only  1.2 percent per year, while  in Malaysia,  capital inflows  averaged 
11.4 percent. 
Thus prudence in managing both exchange rates and banking systems 
seems  to pay  off.  But this  begs  the question  how  overvaluation  and 
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large capital  inflows  are associated  with massive  real appreciation in 
some countries,  and with real depreciation in others. The Asian coun- 
tries, in particular, seem to have been able to absorb large quantities of 
foreign  resources  (as  a percent  of  GDP)  without  experiencing  sharp 
changes  in relative  prices.  In part, this was  probably related to their 
offsetting  fiscal  restraint.  The  performance  of  Chile,  Colombia,  and 
Indonesia seems to suggest  that flexible  and pragmatic management of 
the nominal  exchange  rate also  matters.  Finally,  the underlying  eco- 
nomic structure may play a role. We provide some preliminary evidence 
to suggest  that countries with large,  labor-intensive  tradeables sectors 
find it easier to reallocate  labor between  tradeables and nontradeables 
without inciting  massive  shifts in relative prices. 
Furthermore, large inflows of foreign capital need not cause a frenzy 
in bank lending  and a growing  stock of bad loans,  as the experiences 
of Malaysia  and Chile  show.  The domestic  regulatory environment  is 
more determinative  of whether a crisis  will  occur,  but here the policy 
questions  are many.  In particular, the capital  adequacy  and liquidity 
standards typically  emphasized  in  developed  economies  may  not  be 
sufficient  to  regulate  the  volatile  environment  of  emerging  markets. 
Much more must be learned-and  put into practice by vigilant regula- 
tors-in  order to avoid further repetitions of the boom and bust financial 
cycle. 
APPPENDIX  A 
Data 
THIS  APPENDIX describes  the construction  of the data presented in the 
text.  Line references  in parentheses are to the International  Financial 
Statistics  cd-rom. 
Real Exchange  Rate Depreciation 
We use the percentage change in the weighted average of the bilateral 
real exchange  rates (using CPIs) with respect to the yen, the dollar, and 
the DM  as a proxy  for real exchange  rate depreciation.  The weights Jeffrey  D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andres Velasco  195 
sum to one and are proportional to the bilateral trade shares with Japan, 
the United States,  and the European Union.  The extent of depreciation 
is measured as the percentage increase in the real exchange  rate index 
between  its average during  1986-89  and its average during 1990-94. 
To construct the index,  we  compute  the trade shares from the IMF's 
Direction  of Trade Statistics  (various years),  and we use average nom- 
inal exchange  rates (line  rf from the IFS cd-rom) and CPIs (line  64). 
For countries  with  multiple  exchange  rates,  we  use  the parallel rate. 
For  Venezuela,  our  source  is  the  periodical  VenEconomy  (Caracas: 
VenEconomia  Distribuidores,  various issues);  for India, it is the World 
Currency Yearbook (Philip  P.  Cowitt,  Brooklyn,  N.Y.:  International 
Currency Analysis,  Inc.) for 1986-89  and the U.S.  Congress's  Country 
Reports on Economic  Policy  and Trade Practices  for  1990-92.  Since 
India abandoned its multiple exchange  rate regime in  1993,  for subse- 
quent years we use the official  rate from the IFS cd-rom. 
Lending Boom 
For each year,  we calculate the ratio of claims on the private sector 
by deposit  money  banks and monetary authorities (line  32d)  to GDP 
(line 99b).  When inflation is high,  this ratio is biased upward because 
the available  annual figure for claims on the private sector corresponds 
to the  figure for December,  while  nominal  GDP  reflects  the average 
price level  over the entire year.  To correct for this bias,  we  multiply 
the biased ratio by the ratio of the average price level  to the price level 
for December.  When inflation is low,  this factor is basically  equal to 
one.  The  variable  used  in the regression  is the percentage  change  in 
this ratio from  1990 to  1994 (the period of capital inflows).  Claims on 
the private sector for Indonesia  are taken from Key Indicators  of De- 
veloping  Asian  and  Pacific  Countries  (Manila:  Asian  Development 
Bank, various issues)  (hereafter, Key Indicators); and for South Africa, 
from the  Quarterly  Bulletin  (Pretoria: South African  Reserve  Bank, 
various issues). 
Ratio of M2 to Reserves 
This ratio is calculated  for November  1994. To obtain the figure for 
reserves,  we  convert  total  reserves  minus  gold  (line  11) to  national 
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M2, we use the sum of money (line 34) and quasi-money  (line 35).  For 
Indonesia,  the value of M2 is obtained from Key Indicators,  since the 
corresponding IFS series does not go beyond  1992. 
Crisis Index 
The crisis index is the depreciation rate of the real exchange rate plus 
the negative  of  the percentage  change  in reserves between  November 
1994  and  a  given  month  in  1995.  Each  of  the  two  components  is 
weighted  by its precision  (the inverse of the variance) over the sum of 
precisions.  Precisions  are calculated  using ten years of monthly data. 
India and Venezuela  had multiple  exchange  rates during part of  this 
ten-year period.  For India, we calculate the precisions  using data start- 
ing in 1993, the year in which the country returned to a single exchange 
rate regime.  For Venezuela,  we calculate the precisions  using data for 
the  parallel  rate  starting  in June  1994,  when  the  country  adopted  a 
multiple exchange  rate regime. 
Current Account 
The  current account  (line  78al)  is  converted  to  national  currency 
using the annual average exchange  rate (line rf). Current account data 
are not  available  for  the  following  countries  in  the  years  specified: 
Argentina  (1994),  Colombia  (1993,  1994),  India (1993,  1994),  Paki- 
stan (1994),  the Philippines (1994),  and Zimbabwe (1994).  The missing 
data are obtained using the respective  IMF Recent Economic Develop- 
ments (various years) for these countries.  We measure the figure from 
the  report as  a share of  GDP,  and enter  it  in the  regression  in two 
different  ways:  as  the  average  over  the period  1990-94,  and as  the 
percentage  change from  1990 to  1994.  In the cases  of India and Zim- 
babwe,  since  data are not available  for  1994,  we use  1993 as the end 
point. 
Investment and Saving 
To  obtain  measures  of  investment  and saving,  we  use  gross  fixed 
capital  formation  (line  93e).  We  use  other sources  for Turkey,  Zim- 
babwe,  and India because  national account data are not available  for 
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For Turkey,  we  use  data from  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation  and Development's  National  Accounts.  For Zimbabwe,  we 
obtain  data from  the  World  Bank's  World Tables  (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University  Press,  various years).  Data for 1994 are not avail- 
able for India and Zimbabwe.  For these  countries,  we  obtain the in- 
vestment and savings variables for that year using 1993 as the end point. 
Saving is constructed as the sum of investment and the current account. 
Government Consumption 
Government consumption  is taken from line 91f of the IFS cd-rom. 
Since data are not available for Argentina, the country is excluded from 
the regression  that includes  this variable. 
Capital Inflows 
We construct this variable by adding the capital account (78bc),  the 
financial account (line 78bj),  and net errors and omissions  (line 78ca). 
The  sum  is  converted  to  national  currency using  the  annual average 
exchange  rate (we use the IMF's new definition of the balance of pay- 
ments; see the fifth edition  of the Balance  of Payments Manual).  This 
measure  of  capital  inflows  is  similar  to  the  "old"  definition  of  the 
capital  account.  Data  are missing  for  Argentina  (1994),  Colombia 
(1993,  1994),  India  (1993,  1994),  Pakistan  (1994),  the  Philippines 
(1994),  and  Zimbabwe  (1994).  We  use  the  respective  IMF  Recent 
Economic Developments  (various years) for these countries to complete 
the  series,  although  not  even  these  data are available  for  India  and 
Zimbabwe. 
Short-Term Capital Inflows 
The  source  for  short-term capital  inflows  is the IMF's  Balance  of 
Payments  Statistics.  This  variable  is the sum of  portfolio  investment 
(line  4600  of this publication),  errors and omissions  (line  4998),  and 
other short-term flows.  The latter is constructed by identifying  short- 
term flows  within  the category  of  "other  investments"  in the IMF's 
standard presentation  of the capital account  (lines  4727,  4733,  4734, 
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Taiwan 
Taiwan  is not included  in any IMF or World Bank data base.  Our 
main source for data on Taiwan is Key Indicators.  However,  monthly 
figures for reserves and the nominal exchange rate are from the Monthly 
Bulletin  of  Statistics  of  the Republic  of  China  (Taipei:  Directorate- 
General of the Budget,  Accounting  and Statistics,  various issues)  and 
various issues  of the Economist. Comments 
and Discussion 
Guillermo  A. Calvo: This is a very interesting paper that pulls together 
the various experiences  associated  with the infamous Tequila effect.  It 
identifies  three  main  factors  that explain  the  depth of  the  crisis:  an 
appreciated currency, larger than normal expansion  in bank credit, and 
low levels  of international reserves.  As a yardstick for the adequacy of 
reserves, the authors select the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves, 
not the conventional  ratio of reserves to one month's worth of imports, 
the idea being  that balance  of payments crises  take the form of  a run 
against currency and are rarely associated  with an import spree.  Em- 
pirical estimates  show that the first two factors have significant coeffi- 
cients if reserves are sufficiently  low.  Even more interesting, the paper 
argues that popular  candidate  factors  like  current account  and fiscal 
deficits  do  not  appear to  be  significant,  confirming  results  obtained 
earlier by Jeffrey  Frankel and Andrew Rose,  and Graciela Kaminsky 
and Carmen Reinhart. ' 
The  authors do  not  intend  that their empirical  results  give  a full 
explanation  of  the Mexican  crisis  or the Tequila  effect.  Rather, they 
test the hypothesis  that the more vulnerable  a country was before the 
Tequila  episode,  the  more profound its crisis  was  likely  to be.  (The 
crisis  index  is a weighted  average of devaluation  and loss  of  interna- 
tional reserves  after the Mexican  crisis.) 
I find myself  in almost  complete  agreement with the point of view 
espoused  in this paper, that balance of payments crises  stem,  first and 
foremost,  from financial and structural vulnerabilities.  The latter may 
1.  Frankel and Rose (1996);  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
199 200  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, I :1996 
be partially  caused  by  flow  disequilibria,  but a balance  of  payments 
crisis may take place even though a country has been faithfully follow- 
ing IMF-type advice  if,  for instance,  it has concentrated a large chunk 
of its domestic  debt in short-run maturities (like Mexico's  tesobonos). 
Furthermore, if they  run a tight  financial  sector,  countries  can avoid 
balance of payments crises even though flow disequilibria are large, as 
has been the case in Peru. These results are important because they call 
into  serious  question  a major tenet  of  the  "Washington  consensus" 
after the Tequila shock, namely, that economies  that run current account 
deficits of more than 4 percent should be quarantined. 
Turning to the empirical estimates,  which constitute the heart of the 
paper,  I feel  that the  variable  for  bank lending  booms  (LB)  is  well 
chosen.  As Gavin and Hausmann show,  an unusual expansion  of bank 
credit foretells  trouble.2 However,  the role of the real exchange  rate is 
much less  clear.  Japan's  success  was happily accompanied  by a con- 
stantly appreciating currency. Why should Mexico have been different? 
There  are  models  that explain  why  an  appreciation  may  have  very 
different implications  in Japan than in a country like Mexico. 
Suppose,  for example,  that a not fully credible trade liberalization is 
put into effect.  Since individuals believe  that this is a temporary policy, 
they will take advantage of present lower prices and prompt an expen- 
diture boom.  The latter, in turn, is likely  to induce a real appreciation 
of the currency. An expenditure boom,  under some circumstances,  can 
be socially  costly  and-independent  of whether trade liberalization  is 
continued or eventually  abandoned-must  come to an end; that is,  it is 
not sustainable.  Presumably,  the "bad"  appreciation is what bothers 
investors and may induce a run like that in Mexico.  On the other hand, 
if  the  expenditure  boom  was  associated  with  credible  programs,  the 
likelihood  of such a run would be much smaller. The paper, however, 
makes no attempt to distinguish  bad from good currency appreciations. 
Consequently,  I suspect  that the real exchange  rate effect  reported 
in the paper may be a reflection  of other factors,  like credibility,  and 
that it would be much more useful for policy purposes to try to identify 
these directly.  In this respect, I suggest generating a variable that would 
capture the expenditure booms  associated  with bad currency apprecia- 
tion.  If the real exchange  rate appreciation is driven by a lack of cred- 
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ibility,  individuals  are more likely  to expand consumption than invest- 
ment,  especially  than  investment  in highly  durable  goods,  whose 
profitability depends on the nature of the trade regime.  Thus consump- 
tion booms could be an appropriate indicator for bad and unsustainable 
currency appreciations. 
The theoretical model discusses  the pros and cons of a devaluation. 
According to the model,  a devaluation is an effective  pill against reces- 
sion.  The  idea  is  that devaluation  facilitates  an expenditure  switch 
against  tradables,  and thus  accommodates  the decline  in the current 
account deficit necessitated  by capital outflows,  without the need of a 
recession.  But this Econ.  1 price effect  ignores all the financial effects 
of a devaluation.  In Mexico,  for example,  the banks had borrowed in 
dollars and, essentially,  lent in pesos.  Hence  a successful  devaluation 
that increased  the real  exchange  rate might have resulted  in a major 
negative  shock in banks' balance sheets.  This is not just idle thought: 
it appears to have  been  a major consideration  behind the decision  to 
prop up the Mexican peso after the crisis of December  1994. In Argen- 
tina, the disruption could have been many times larger. Therefore, I do 
not see a clear trade-off. 
Turning to the metric used for reserves adequacy (the M2-to-reserves 
ratio or its inverse),  a plausible  alternative to the index employed  in 
this paper would be to adjust the ratio of M2 to reserves by its first-log- 
difference  standard deviation.  In a related paper I find that Mexico 
displays  a much  higher  standard deviation  than Austria  (by  a factor 
of  more  than  4  to  1).3  Thus  a  ratio  of  M2  to  reserves  that  would 
be  considered  dangerously  high  in Mexico  is  almost  without  risk  in 
Austria. 
A  major puzzle  that remains  largely  unanswered in this  and other 
papers on the subject is why  Mexico's  output fell  so sharply,  despite 
massive  international assistance,  and why Argentina's  unemployment 
grew to unprecedented levels  (more than 18 percent),  even  though an 
open  balance  of  payments  crisis  was  prevented by the timely  imple- 
mentation  of  an IMF  program.  If,  as  this  paper suggests,  financial 
muscle is a key factor in keeping a country from slipping into the abyss, 
why are the economies  of Mexico  and Argentina in such terrible con- 
dition? The paper suggests  that the international assistance should have 
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helped  these  countries  to  cushion  the  negative  effects  of  a  specula- 
tive  attack.  Was  the  assistance  insufficient,  or the  IMF programs 
inadequate? 
It is too early to tell.  However,  there is some evidence  of both. For 
example,  investors  refused  to  roll  over  the  tesobonos  even  after the 
Mexican  package  had been agreed on,  and despite exceptionally  high 
interest rates.  A  possible  explanation  is that the package  had a clear 
time limit,  it was temporary. If there had been no need for the funds to 
be disbursed,  the treasury would most likely have declared victory and 
withdrawn its support. But this is not likely to have restored permanent 
stability  to  Mexico,  because  investors  already knew  that without  the 
treasury the equilibrium  would  be bad.  Hence  the only  credible  path 
involved  heavy use of foreign  assistance.  This explains  the unwilling- 
ness to roll over Mexican debt despite the package, but why did interest 
rates remain so high? 
This question  requires explicit  consideration  of the associated  IMF 
programs. The bottom line is that Mexico's  current account deficit fell 
from 8 percent  (as  a share of  GDP)  to zero.  This  represents a major 
adjustment. Fiscal policy  was strongly procyclical.  Thus there is some 
evidence  that the stabilization  program itself  may help to explain  the 
sharp downturn in output.  If this was foreseen  by investors,  it would 
likely  be  translated  into  a  higher  country  risk  factor,  which  would 
explain  the high interest rates. 
Was there any alternative? My short answer is,  no.  Relevant  alter- 
natives would have involved  much larger international assistance.  This 
was  not politically  feasible.  The courageous  measures undertaken by 
the IMF and the treasury had already led them to the boundaries of their 
institutional  mandates. 
I conclude  by highlighting  some lessons  from the approach taken in 
this paper, with special  reference to emerging  markets:4 
-Debt  structure is a key factor of macroeconomic  stability.  Short- 
term debt can induce  crises  based on self-fulfilling  expectations.  The 
type of debt holders also seems to matter. Domestic  holders may attach 
a liquidity  factor to domestic  debt, either because  the debt is interme- 
diated  by  banks  or because  it  is  being  used  in repos.  This  liquidity 
factor  is  likely  irrelevant to foreign  holders.  Therefore  large foreign 
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holdings  of  domestic  debt  may  make  its  demand highly  sensitive  to 
expected  net returns, and thus facilitate  self-fulfilling  prophesies. 
-Domestic  financial  liberalization  is desirable,  but should be un- 
dertaken with a great deal of caution. Policymakers  should keep a wary 
eye on sudden surges of bank credit, even though the credit is directed 
toward the private sector and interest rates are free. High bank reserves- 
to-deposit  ratios,  possibly  with  remunerated reserves,  are advisable 
until monetary aggregates  are stabilized. 
-The  choice  of  the exchange  rate regime  should  take account  of 
financial considerations  (for example,  the degree of currency substitu- 
tion, dollarization,  the soundness of the banking system,  and so forth). 
This prescription contrasts with the standard literature on this subject, 
which  emphasizes  aspects  like  the degree  of  price  stickiness  and the 
relative importance of nominal as against real shocks. 
-Beware  of  false  accounting.  Appropriate measures  of  the fiscal 
deficit and the adequacy of reserves are hard to come by,  and standard 
measures can be highly  misleading.  As Gavin and others and Ernesto 
Talvi have recently  shown,  emerging  markets have highly procyclical 
fiscal  revenues.5  Thus during a capital  inflows  episode,  for instance, 
fiscal  accounts  may  look  deceptively  healthy.  For  its  part,  reserves 
adequacy should be measured against all short-term government liabil- 
ities. These include not only M2 but all short maturity debt, independent 
of the currency denomination. 
Richard  N.  Cooper:  With Calvo,  I like the basic thrust of this paper. 
My remarks focus  on some quibbles and some observations  stimulated 
by the paper. 
The main results are built around the fitted equation that purports to 
give  some explanation  of  what the authors call  the crisis  index,  or to 
indicate  the  likelihood  of  a financial  crisis.  But  what exactly  is  the 
nature of this fitted equation? Does  it characterize the behavior of pri- 
vate actors? It is a peculiar formulation.  Multiplying  two variables  in 
which there is some a priori interest is a bit arbitrary, particularly when 
one variable is defined as being in the upper quartile of a universe that 
is not fully explained.  It raises the questions of how many experiments 
were run, and whether an effort was made to maximize  the R2. 
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It reminds  me of  the early history  of  applied  statistics  in both the 
sciences  and the social  sciences.  A lot of effort was devoted  to curve 
fitting,  to  finding  a curve  that fits a particular set of  data as well  as 
possible.  It is worth keeping  in mind that while  they use a sample of 
eight  countries,  the  authors  are basically  addressing  one  episode- 
worldwide  reaction to the Mexican  crisis  in the early months of  1995. 
A  normative  or policy  interpretation is  possible.  If the Brookings 
papers circulate as widely  as many of us hope that they do, the financial 
community  and governments  around the world will discover this equa- 
tion and build their expectations  around it.  In future there will  not be 
any financial  crises  of  the type  that occurred in early  1995,  because 
governments  will  be  sure  to  keep  the  variables  above  or below  the 
thresholds indicated in this paper, and the private sector, observing that 
governments  have  done  so,  will  behave  properly.  That can  only  be 
tested in the future. It would have been helpful,  however,  if the authors 
had tested this equation on at least one past episode  that was not used 
to fit it.  An equation fitted around a single  episode  does not give  high 
confidence. 
The most interesting results of the paper are the negative  ones.  The 
authors examine  a number of  hypotheses  that have been broached in 
financial,  policy,  or academic circles,  largely generalizations from this 
Mexican  episode,  and  show  that  they  do  not  stand up  under close 
scrutiny in a wider universe.  In particular, they look at the size of the 
current account deficit:  8 percent of GDP is often  said to be too high 
for stability.  The authors mention Malaysia  as a nice counterexample. 
They could just as well  have mentioned Hungary, although its govern- 
ment recently  took  major constrictive  action.  Peru's  current account 
deficit  is  up  in  this  range  in  1996.  Should  the  financial  community 
worry seriously  about Peru? The authors' equation clearly says no,  so 
long as M2 is adequately low relative to reserves.  The negative results 
are  interesting  and  a  little  sobering;  they  warn against  generalizing 
casually  about the world from a single  episode. 
The  authors  draw  the  conventional,  unfavorable  comparison  of 
booms  based on consumption  with booms  based on investment.  They 
argue that booms  based  on  investment  might  not  have  such  a large 
impact on the price of nontradeable goods because investment is largely 
composed of imported goods.  I would like to challenge that assumption. 
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tion is quintessentially  a nontradeable, except in those rare cases where 
whole  teams of construction workers are imported from Korea or else- 
where.  In contrast,  the consumption  boom  in Chile  in the late  1970s 
and early  1980s was largely in importable consumer durables. In these 
examples,  it is measured investment,  not consumption,  that drives up 
the  price  of  nontradeables.  However,  it  is  an artifact of  accounting 
conventions  that economists  consider construction-particularly  hous- 
ing construction-as  investment,  and purchases of consumer durables 
as consumption. 
The authors write as though they know the relative price of nontrade- 
ables.  I urge caution  about identifying  the "real  exchange  rate"  as it 
is normally measured (and is here) with the relative price of nontrade- 
ables,  and encourage  attempts to  approximate the latter directly,  for 
example,  by measuring the price of export goods  for which  supply is 
somewhat elastic relative to value-added prices in retail or construction. 
My guess is that there is only a weak correlation between such measures 
and that used  by  the  authors,  which  involves  consumer  price  index 
comparisons  adjusted by market exchange  rates. 
In searching  for determinants or predictors of  financial crises,  the 
authors curiously  neglect  history and reputation. I would have thought 
that the simplest and most straightforward explanation for why Mexico, 
Argentina,  and Venezuela  ran into trouble,  while Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Korea did not, is that the former had run into trouble before,  while 
the latter had knuckled down and handled their equally  large negative 
shocks in a much smoother way. The latter countries, unlike the former, 
have no recent history of  agonizing  debt rescheduling  combined  with 
serious domestic  pressure for outright debt repudiation. 
Since  the  issue  here  is  expectations,  the most  natural observation 
would  seem  to be that when  countries  are hit by a negative  shock  of 
some kind, modestly risk-averse investors-whether  based in New York 
or London,  or indeed  in Mexico  City,  Buenos  Aires,  or Singapore- 
would hold on to their Thai and Malaysian investments but dump their 
investments  in Mexico  and Argentina and Venezuela.  History and ex- 
perience and the associated  reputations of these countries indicate that 
course of  action.  This obvious  hypothesis  is remarkably absent in the 
discussion,  except  insofar as it may be captured indirectly in some of 
the included variables. 
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sion,  so  it is  worth noting  that apparently it was  Mexican  residents, 
rather than foreigners,  who  dumped Mexican  securities  first and sold 
in large volume.  Foreigners were still holding on after the assassination 
of presidential candidate Colossio  and the other events of March 1994. 
Indeed,  they  continued  to  invest  in Mexico  through October,  and to 
hold their assets even  through November  and most of December. 
The formal model distinguishes  between domestic and foreign hold- 
ers of assets,  with an (unstated) assumption that foreigners are the more 
skittish.  But it is usually  the domestic  holders that have the more nu- 
anced inside knowledge;  such knowledge  can be, and probably is, con- 
veyed  to the major financial centers,  but it is less likely to be absorbed 
by the decisionmakers  there. The Mexican experience  also serves as a 
warning not to look just at liabilities  to foreigners,  as is often done (but 
not here),  when assessing  the financial exposure of a country. 
One of the big puzzles  is that when the December  1994 peso deval- 
uation  occurred,  many  members  of  the financial  community  seemed 
genuinely  surprised-in  spite  of  the fact  that economists  like  Dorn- 
busch,  John Williamson,  and other members of  the Brookings  Panel 
had been  saying  for many months,  "Mexico  is in trouble.  It is over- 
extended.  It is  financially  fragile."  The  financial community  simply 
did not believe  the warnings,  or the analysis underlying them. 
Anyone  who  believes,  or even  uses,  rational expectations  should 
worry a lot about this particular episode.  When Mexico  did devalue, 
parts of the New  York financial community expressed disbelief.  It was 
inconceivable.  The Mexicans  could not do that. They had violated  our 
trust-a  false trust it turned out to be-regardless  of the fact that many 
economists  had been saying that devaluation was perfectly sensible and, 
in fact,  sooner or later would be required. The Mexican episode under- 
lines  the profound weakness  of the typical  assumption of rational ex- 
pectations,  that all agents use the same model of the world,  and that it 
is the correct model. 
The Mexican  episode  and its associated  Tequila effect  also  under- 
lines the well-known  but little-understood point that any modern finan- 
cial  system  is  basically  a house  of  cards.  Such  a system  necessarily 
involves  maturity transformation,  and therefore it relies  on the law of 
large numbers: that is to say, independent, imperfectly correlated trans- 
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markets  in  general,  and  it  holds  for  financial  markets  in  particular 
countries,  such as Mexico  and Argentina.  When something  signals  all 
individual  transactcrs to move  in the same direction in the same short 
interval, the basic fragility of any financial system is revealed.  This is 
not a new point; it has attracted the attention of economists  since  the 
early nineteenth century. 
Finally,  what,  if any,  policy  guidelines  can one draw from this ex- 
perience and from this paper? Obviously,  countries have to follow  good 
policies,  but as this paper shows,  following  good  monetary and fiscal 
policies  is  not by  itself  sufficient.  In addition to good  policies,  they 
have to have a sound financial structure. Yet,  as I have just indicated, 
in some fundamental sense  there is no such thing as a sound financial 
structure that serves  its economies  well.  Most financial structures are 
intrinsically  unsound,  in that a one-sided  decision  on  the part of  all 
agents can throw them into deep trouble. Can collective  (governmental) 
actions reduce that prospect? 
Two  questions,  in  particular,  need  to  be  addressed.  The  first  is 
whether  countries  such  as  the  ones  discussed  here  should  integrate 
themselves  more completely  into the world financial market suddenly 
or gradually.  For those  who  like  hydraulic  images,  if the water in a 
blocked  channel  is at two different levels,  should one remove the ob- 
stacle  quickly,  or should  one  first pump some  water from the upper 
level  to the lower  level  to  slow  the rush when the obstacle  is finally 
removed?  This  is  a live  issue  that many countries  face.  Should  they 
liberalize  capital movements  in one go,  as is being called for by mem- 
bers of the international financial community and, increasingly,  by the 
international  financial  institutions?  Or,  should  they  maintain  some 
brakes on capital movements until their economies  are more thoroughly 
integrated into the world market, to avoid problems of huge financial 
surges? Or, are huge surges,  in fact,  less  likely  if integration is under- 
taken quickly? 
The  second  policy  issue  is  whether  the  international  community 
should organize itself  institutionally  to deal with one-sided  surges.  An 
ad hoc package was put together for Mexico  and, like Calvo,  my own 
view  is that under the circumstances,  it was the right thing to do. The 
damage to real economies  would  have been  much greater without  it. 
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financial lender of last resort on an international scale? And if so,  how 
could it be organized so as to minimize perverse incentive effects  both 
for private players and for national policymakers? 
General  discussion:  The Mexican  currency crisis  of  December  1994 
figured prominently  in the  general  discussion  at the meeting.  James 
Tobin asserted that the severity of the Mexican crisis was hardly justi- 
fied by government  policies  in the years leading up to the collapse  of 
the exchange  rate regime.  He recalled that Mexico  apparently received 
the standard punishment for a country running large budget deficits and 
with substantial monetary inflation when neither the budget deficit nor 
inflation were out of control at the time. He concluded that Mexico  was 
punished for crimes  it did not commit,  and discussed  the factors that 
might have contributed to the severity of its currency crisis.  He noted 
that in previous Mexican currency crises,  investors anticipated that the 
country might default  on  some  of  its international debt and took this 
into account  when negotiating  the terms of  debt contracts.  However, 
during the late  1980s  and early  1990s,  institutions like the IMF and a 
number of commercial  and central banks worked to improve the cred- 
ibility  of  Mexico  in the international financial community  by recom- 
mending that it drop exchange  controls.  The Mexican government fol- 
lowed  this policy  advice,  despite  the fact that the market for its debt 
was known to be very thin under adverse economic  conditions.  Tobin 
argued that the abolition of exchange controls for countries like Mexico 
was premature, and noted that even  some advanced European nations, 
like  France,  maintained  restrictions  on  convertibility  into  the  early 
1980s.  He concluded  that developed  countries bear some of the blame 
for the severity of the Mexican currency crisis because they rushed this 
and other underdeveloped  countries into complete  convertibility  with- 
out allowing  for a safety net in the form of limited exchange  controls. 
James  Duesenberry  agreed  with  Tobin  that the  benefits  of  unre- 
stricted capital movements  to a country like Mexico,  especially  in the 
short run,  are hardly  worth the  costs.  He  noted  that the  benefits  of 
correctly lining up interest rates between the United States and Mexico 
are probably  small,  relative  to the cost  of  sudden speculative  shocks 
and their aftermath. But while he agreed that capital controls would,  in 
principle,  be one way  of  approaching this problem,  he cautioned that 
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not  a viable  policy  option.  Duesenberry  concluded  that floating  ex- 
change rates represent the credible alternative to a policy  that pegs the 
peso against the dollar, while conceding  that floating rates would leave 
a considerable  amount of instability  and uncertainty. 
Alan  Blinder  observed  that Mexico's  decision  to peg  its  currency 
against  the  dollar,  even  when  such  a policy  was  not  fully  credible 
because  of  its large current account deficit,  was  intended as a poison 
pill that would force Mexican policymakers to pursue stabilization pol- 
icies  for fear that devaluation  would destroy their credibility  with for- 
eign lenders.  Blinder emphasized that this represented a high risk strat- 
egy  because  the government  could  not credibly  give  up its option  to 
devalue.  International and Mexican investors recognized this, and when 
a worsening  current account  deficit  made  a devaluation  increasingly 
likely,  they  moved  their assets  to  short-term and very  liquid  invest- 
ments.  As  a result,  just  before  the collapse  of  the peso  there was  an 
avalanche  waiting  to  happen  since  a large number of  investors  were 
poised to withdraw from Mexico.  In retrospect, Blinder concluded,  the 
Mexican  crisis  is an example  of a poison  pill that backfired, since  the 
pegged  peso  policy  ultimately  increased the severity of the crisis. 
Takatoshi Ito and Benjamin Friedman discussed  how the emergence 
of  mutual  funds  as  major players  in  international  financial  markets 
exacerbated  the Mexican  currency collapse.  Ito noted that dedicated 
bond and equity funds barely changed their holdings  during the crisis 
because the managers of these funds have an explicit  mandate to be in 
a certain market, such as Mexico or Latin America. It was mainly global 
bond and equity fund managers who sold heavily  during the crisis and 
bought assets in other, safer countries. Friedman cautioned that holding 
a security via an open-end mutual fund might give the owner the illusion 
of  liquidity  because  he can redeem his  shares with a phone call,  and 
that this  ease  of  redemption  might  have  added to the severity  of  the 
peso collapse.  He noted that a typical retail investor who holds an equity 
in Mexico  or some other emerging  market is probably well  aware that 
he is in a highly  illiquid market. By contrast, if this same investor were 
to hold a share in an open-end mutual fund that held Mexican equities, 
he might readily redeem his shares, thus forcing fund managers to sell 
illiquid  securities.  Ito added that the peso  crisis  might have been less 
severe  had  it not  taken  place  during the  Christmas  week,  when  the 
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rebalancing  their portfolios  in time  for their balance  sheet  reporting 
deadline of December  31,  thereby adding to market volatility. 
Among those  who contemplated  institutional changes  aimed at pre- 
venting  similar  crises  in the future,  Gregory Mankiw  doubted that a 
currency board alone  would  have  protected Mexico  from severe  eco- 
nomic disruption. A currency board might have helped Mexico to avoid 
the peso crisis,  but at the cost of severe disruption to the banking sector. 
He observed  that while  the foremost goal of any central bank must be 
the preservation of the unit of account, the health of the banking sector 
is also vital to the functioning  of an economy.  Therefore,  the Mexican 
central bank really had two objectives  in the period leading up to the 
crisis: the preservation of the unit of account and the continued solvency 
of the banking system.  Mankiw maintained that joint  implementation 
of a currency board and narrow banking, whereby demand deposits are 
fully backed by short-term liquid assets,  might have satisfied both pol- 
icy goals  of the Mexican  central bank because the former would prob- 
ably have avoided  an exchange  rate crisis,  while the latter would have 
made bank runs unlikely. 
Laurence  Kotlikoff  suggested  that it  would  be  easier  for  Mexico 
simply  to dollarize  and get out of the business  of having its own  cur- 
rency altogether.  He imagined that under these circumstances,  Mexico 
would take the dollar as its currency and adopt all U.S.  financial insti- 
tutions and regulations,  such as deposit insurance. Kotlikoff explained 
that this move would eliminate  a lot of uncertainty in financial markets 
and allow Mexico  much improved access to international lenders. Rich- 
ard Cooper responded by noting that the value of retaining the peso  is 
measured in seigniorage,  which  amounts to about 1.5 to 2 percent for 
a middle-income  country  such  as Mexico.  He  emphasized  that seig- 
niorage  represents  an  important source  of  revenue  for  the  Mexican 
government,  especially  since  tax evasion  and the secondary economy 
are substantial.  To this,  Mankiw responded that the seigniorage  prob- 
lem could be resolved by ordering the U.S.  Treasury to turn over to the 
Mexican government the extra seigniorage  arising from the dollar's use 
in Mexico. 
Commenting on the role of the Tequila effect  during the peso crisis, 
Ito observed that a number of countries,  including Argentina and Thai- 
land, instituted measures to shore up their currencies against speculative 
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these and other countries could be described by a reaction function,  and 
a country's  success  in fending off speculative  attacks would depend on 
a threshold  specific  to each country.  Ito reasoned that some  countries 
might  well  have  suffered  devaluations  in the wake  of  the December 
1994 peso crisis if they had not had the time and the means to implement 
policies  that kept them from crossing their thresholds.  Ito also used the 
example  of  an emerging  markets  mutual fund  to  illustrate  how  the 
Tequila effect  might work. Managers of a Latin American mutual fund 
might respond to a Mexican currency crisis by selling their holdings  in 
other Latin American  countries  in order to raise  cash  with  which  to 
meet expected  share redemptions.  An emerging markets fund manager 
might  react to  a peso  crisis  by  selling  shares in Thailand  and Hong 
Kong,  and thus contagion  might occur  simply  because  of  fund man- 
agers'  behavior.  Ito added that while  he found  such a Tequila  effect 
plausible,  he has not seen evidence  of one. 
A number of participants also discussed  the extent to which markets 
anticipated the December  1994 peso crisis,  and what could be inferred 
about investor rationality from the degree of surprise in financial mar- 
kets when the peso  actually collapsed.  In response to Cooper's  formal 
comments,  Mankiw thought it unlikely  that the peso crisis casts doubt 
on  the  rationality  of  investors  on  Wall  Street.  While  he  agreed  that 
investors  consistently  ignored economists,  who were overwhelmingly 
predicting a currency crisis in the period leading up to December  1994, 
he observed  that this may have been perfectly  rational in light of  the 
profession's  track record.  Cooper  replied that investors'  decisions  to 
ignore economists  might indeed have been perfectly rational. However, 
he  noted  that  the  extent  of  surprise  on  Wall  Street  when  the  peso 
collapsed  is hard to reconcile  with rationality,  given  that devaluation 
was  seen  as a sensible  and necessary  action by a wide variety of cal- 
culations,  even at the time.  Blinder reported that at the time of the peso 
crisis,  a number of central bankers and private investors  claimed  that 
the volume  of tesobonos  was secret and unknown to them; this despite 
the  fact  that the  tesobonos  were  issued  in  public  auctions,  and the 
quantities were announced every  single  time.  Blinder thought this ex- 
perience  a good  illustration  that market participants were  not acting 
rationally at the time  of the peso  crisis.  Ito emphasized  that financial 
markets were completely  surprised by the collapse  of  the peso.  From 
conversations  with market participants, he had learned that a great deal 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
of trust was placed in the pronouncements of the Mexican government, 
and that many investors  suffered  substantial losses,  having borrowed 
in dollars  and lent  in pesos.  Velasco  agreed that the peso's  collapse 
was largely  unanticipated,  noting that in the months before the crisis, 
interest rate spreads between  peso  and dollar assets  were very  stable. 
Financial  markets did not reflect a rising probability of devaluation  in 
the months leading  up to December  1994. Jeffrey  D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andre's  Velasco  213 
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